Blazing Rows: Meynardo Sabili v. Comelec

Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Baguio City

EN BANC

MEYNARDO SABILI,

Petitioner,

- versus -

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and FLORENCIO LIBREA,

Respondents.

G. R. No. 193261

Present:

CORONA, C.J.,

CARPIO,

VELASCO, JR.,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

BRION,

PERALTA,

BERSAMIN,

DEL CASTILLO,

ABAD,

VILLARAMA, JR.,

PEREZ,

MENDOZA,

SERENO,

REYES, and

PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.

Promulgated:

April 24, 2012

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D E C I S I O N

SERENO, J.:

Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to annul the Resolutions in SPA No. 09-047 (DC) dated 26 January 2010 and 17 August 2010 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), which denied due course to and canceled the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of petitioner Meynardo Sabili (petitioner) for the position of Mayor of Lipa City for the May 2010 elections. At the

heart of the controversy is whether petitioner Sabili had complied with the one-year residency requirement for local elective officials.

When petitioner filed his COC[1] for mayor of Lipa City for the 2010 elections, he stated therein that he had been a resident of the city for two (2) years and eight (8) months. Prior to the 2010 elections, he had been twice elected (in 1995 and in 1998) as Provincial Board Member representing the 4^th District of Batangas. During the 2007 elections, petitioner ran for the position of Representative of the 4^th District of Batangas, but lost. The 4^th District of Batangas includes Lipa City.[2]However, it is undisputed that when petitioner filed his COC during the 2007 elections, he and his family were then staying at his ancestral home in Barangay (Brgy.) Sico, San Juan, Batangas.

Private respondent Florencio Librea (private respondent) filed a “Petition to Deny Due Course and to Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and to Disqualify a Candidate for Possessing Some Grounds for Disqualification”[3] against him before the COMELEC, docketed as SPA No. 09-047 (DC). Citing Section 78 in relation to Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code,[4] private respondent alleged that petitioner made material misrepresentations of fact in the latter’s COC and likewise failed to comply with the one-year residency requirement under Section 39 of the Local Government Code. [5] Allegedly, petitioner falsely declared under oath in his COC that he had already been a resident of Lipa City for two years and eight months prior to the scheduled 10 May 2010 local elections.

In support of his allegation, private respondent presented the following:

1. Petitioner’s COC for the 2010 elections filed on 1 December 2009[6]

2. 2009 Tax Declarations for a house and lot (TCT Nos. 173355, 173356 and buildings thereon) in Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City registered under the name of Bernadette Palomares, petitioner’s common-law wife[7]

3. Lipa City Assessor Certification of Property Holdings of properties under the name of Bernadette Palomares[8]

4. Affidavit executed by private respondent Florencio Librea[9]

5. Sinumpaang Salaysay executed by Eladio de Torres[10]

6. Voter Certification on petitioner issued by COMELEC Election Officer Juan D. Aguila, Jr.[11]

7. 1997 Voter Registration Record of petitioner[12]

8. National Statistics Office (NSO) Advisory on Marriages regarding petitioner[13]

9. Lipa City Assessor Certificate of No Improvement on Block 2, Lot 3, Brgy. Lood, Lipa City registered in the name of petitioner[14]

10. NSO Certificate of No Marriage of Bernadette Palomares[15]

11. Lipa City Assessor Certificate of No Improvement on Block 2, Lot 5, Brgy. Lood, Lipa City registered in the name of petitioner[16]

12. Lipa City Permits and Licensing Office Certification that petitioner has no business therein[17]

13. Apparent printout of a Facebook webpage of petitioner’s daughter, Mey Bernadette Sabili[18]

14. Department of Education (DepEd) Lipa City Division Certification that the names Bernadette Palomares, Mey Bernadette Sabili and Francis Meynard Sabili (petitioner’s son) do not appear on its list of graduates[19]

15. Certification from the Office of the Election Officer of Lipa City that Bernadette Palomares, Mey Bernadette Sabili and Francis Meynard Sabili do not appear in its list of voters[20]

16. Affidavit executed by Violeta Fernandez[21]

17. Affidavit executed by Rodrigo Macasaet[22]

18. Affidavit Executed by Pablo Lorzano[23]

19. Petitioner’s 2007 COC for Member of House of Representative[24]

For ease of later discussion, private respondent’s evidence shall be grouped as follows: (1) Certificates regarding ownership of real property; (2) petitioner’s Voter Registration and Certification (common exhibits of the parties); (3) petitioner’s COCs in previous elections; (3) Certifications regarding petitioner’s family members; and (4) Affidavits of Lipa City residents.

On the other hand, petitioner presented the following evidence to establish the fact of his residence in Lipa City:

1. Affidavit executed by Bernadette Palomares[25]

2. Birth Certificate of Francis Meynard Sabili[26]

3. Affidavit of Leonila Suarez (Suarez)[27]

4. Certification of Residency issued by Pinagtong-ulan Barangay Captain, Dominador Honrade[28]

5. Affidavit executed by Rosalinda Macasaet[29]

6. Certificate of Appreciation issued to petitioner by the parish of Sto. Nino of Pinagtong-ulan[30]

7. Designation of petitioner in the Advisory Body (AB) of Pinagtong-ulan, San Jose/Lipa City Chapter of Guardians Brotherhood, Inc.[31]

8. COMELEC Voter Certification on petitioner issued by Election Officer Juan Aguila, Jr.[32]

9. COMELEC Application for Transfer/Transfer with Reactivation dated 6 June 2009 signed by Election Officer Juan Aguila, Jr.[33]

10. Petitioner’s Income Tax Return for 2007[34]

11. Official Receipt for petitioner’s income tax payment for 2007[35]

12. Petitioner’s Income Tax Return for 2008[36]

13. Official Receipt for petitioner’s income tax payment for 2008[37]

14. Birth Certificate of Mey Bernadette Sabili[38]

15. Affidavit executed by Jacinto Cornejo, Sr.[39]

16. Joint Affidavit of twenty-one (21) Pinagtong-ulan residents, including past and incumbent Pinagtong-ulan officials.[40]

For ease of later discussion, petitioner’s evidence shall be grouped as follows: (1) his Income Tax Returns and corresponding Official Receipts for the years 2007 and 2008; (2) Certification from the barangay captain of Pinagtong-ulan; (3) Affidavit of his common-law wife, Bernadette Palomares; and (4) Affidavits from a previous property owner, neighbors, Certificate of Appreciation from the barangay parish and Memorandum from the local chapter of Guardians Brotherhood, Inc.

The COMELEC Ruling

In its Resolution dated 26 January 2010,[41] the COMELEC Second Division granted the Petition of private respondent, declared petitioner as disqualified from seeking the mayoralty post in Lipa City, and canceled his Certificate of Candidacy for his not being a resident of Lipa City and for his failure to meet the statutory one-year residency requirement under the law.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the 26 January 2010 Resolution of the COMELEC, during the pendency of which the 10 May 2010 local elections were held. The next day, he was proclaimed the duly elected mayor of Lipa City after garnering the highest number of votes cast for the said position. He accordingly filed a Manifestation[42] with the COMELEC en banc to reflect this fact.

In its Resolution dated 17 August 2010,[43] the COMELEC en banc denied the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner. Although he was able to receive his copy of the Resolution, no prior notice setting the date of promulgation of the said Resolution was received by him. Meanwhile, Section 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8696 (Rules on Disqualification Cases Filed in Connection with the May 10, 2012 Automated National and Local Elections) requires the parties to be notified in advance of the date of the promulgation of the Resolution.

SEC. 6. Promulgation. – The promulgation of a Decision or Resolution of the Commission or a Division shall be made on a date previously fixed, notice of which shall be served in advance upon the parties or their attorneys personally, or by registered mail, telegram, fax, or thru the fastest means of communication.

Hence, petitioner filed with this Court a Petition (Petition for Certiorari with Extremely Urgent Application for the Issuance of a Status Quo Order and for the Conduct of a Special Raffle of this Case) under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking the annulment of the 26 January 2010 and 17 August 2010 Resolutions of the COMELEC. Petitioner attached to his Petition a Certificate of Canvass of Votes and proclamation of Winning Candidates for Lipa City Mayor and Vice-Mayor issued by the City/Municipal Board of Canvassers,[44] as well as a copy of his Oath of Office.[45] He also attached to his Petition another Certification of Residency[46] issued by Pinagtong-ulan Barangay Captain Dominador Honrade and sworn to before a notary public.

On 7 September 2010, this Court issued a Status Quo Ante Order[47] requiring the parties to observe the status quo prevailing before the issuance of the assailed COMELEC Resolutions. Thereafter, the parties filed their responsive pleadings.

Issues

The following are the issues for resolution:

1. Whether the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it failed to promulgate its Resolution dated 17 August 2010 in accordance with its own Rules of Procedure; and

2. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that Sabili failed to prove compliance with the one-year residency requirement for local elective officials.

The Court’s Ruling

1. On whether the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it failed to promulgate its Resolution dated 17 August 2010 in accordance with its own Rules of Procedure

Petitioner argues that the assailed 17 August 2010 COMELEC Resolution, which denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration, is null and void. The Resolution was allegedly not promulgated in accordance with the COMELEC’s own Rules of Procedure and, hence, violated petitioner’s right to due process of law.

The rules governing the Petition for Cancellation of COC in this case is COMELEC Resolution No. 8696 (Rules on Disqualification of Cases Filed in Connection with the May 10, 2010 Automated National and Local Elections), which was promulgated on 11 November 2009. Sections 6 and 7 thereof provide as follows:

SEC. 6. Promulgation. - The promulgation of a Decision or Resolution of the Commission or a Division shall be made on a date previously fixed, notice of which shall be served in advance upon the parties or their attorneys personally, or by registered mail, telegram, fax or thru the fastest means of communication.

SEC. 7. Motion for Reconsideration. - A motion to reconsider a Decision, Resolution, Order or Ruling of a Division shall be filed within three (3) days from the promulgation thereof. Such motion, if not pro-forma, suspends the execution for implementation of the Decision, Resolution, Order or Ruling.

Within twenty-four (24) hours from the filing thereof, the Clerk of the Commission shall notify the Presiding Commissioner. The latter shall within two (2) days thereafter certify the case to the Commission en banc.

The Clerk of the Commission shall calendar the Motion for Reconsideration for the resolution of the Commission en banc within three (3) days from the certification thereof.

However, the COMELEC Order dated 4 May 2010[48] suspended Section 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8696 by ordering that “all resolutions be delivered to the Clerk of the Commission for immediate promulgation” in view of “the proximity of the Automated National and Local Elections and lack of material time.” The Order states:

ORDER

Considering the proximity of the Automated National and Local Elections and lack of material time, the Commission hereby suspends Sec. 6 of Resolution No. 8696 promulgated on November 11, 2009, which reads:

Sec. 6. Promulgation. – The promulgation of a Decision or Resolution of the Commission or a Division shall be made on a date previously fixed, notice of which shall be served upon the parties or their attorneys personally, or by registered mail, telegram, fax or thru the fastest means of communication.”

Let all resolutions be delivered to the Clerk of the Commission for immediate promulgation.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner claims that he did not receive notice of the said suspension of Section 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8696. Thus, his right to due process was still violated. On the other hand, the COMELEC claims that it has the power to suspend its own rules of procedure and invokes Section 6, Article IX-A of the Constitution, which gives it the power “to promulgate its own rules concerning pleadings and practice before it or before any of its offices.”

We agree with the COMELEC on this issue.

In Lindo v. Commission on Elections,[49] petitioner claimed that there was no valid promulgation of a Decision in an election protest case when a copy thereof was merely furnished the parties, instead of first notifying the parties of a set date for the promulgation thereof, in accordance with Section 20 of Rule 35 of the COMELEC’s own Rules of Procedure, as follows:

Sec. 20. Promulgation and Finality of Decision. — The decision of the court shall be promulgated on a date set by it of which due notice must be given the parties. It shall become final five (5) days after promulgation. No motion for reconsideration shall be entertained.

Rejecting petitioner’s argument, we held therein that the additional rule requiring notice to the parties prior to promulgation of a decision is not part of the process of promulgation. Since lack of such notice does not prejudice the rights of the parties, noncompliance with this rule is a procedural lapse that does not vitiate the validity of the decision. Thus:

This contention is untenable. Promulgation is the process by which a decision is published, officially announced, made known to the public or delivered to the clerk of court for filing, coupled with notice to the parties or their counsel (Neria v. Commissioner of Immigration, L-24800, May 27, 1968, 23 SCRA 812). It is the delivery of a court decision to the clerk of court for filing and publication (Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 433). It is the filing of the signed decision with the clerk of court (Sumbing v. Davide, G.R. Nos. 86850-51, July 20, 1989, En Banc Minute Resolution). The additional requirement imposed by the COMELEC rules of notice in advance of promulgation is not part of the process of promulgation. Hence, We do not agree with petitioner’s contention that there was no promulgation of the trial court's decision. The trial court did not deny that it had officially made the decision public. From the recital of facts of both parties, copies of the decision were sent to petitioner's counsel of record and petitioner’s (sic) himself. Another copy was sent to private respondent.

What was wanting and what the petitioner apparently objected to was not the promulgation of the decision but the failure of the trial court to serve notice in advance of the promulgation of its decision as required by the COMELEC rules. The failure to serve such notice in advance of the promulgation may be considered a procedural lapse on the part of the trial court which did not prejudice the rights of the parties and did not vitiate the validity of the decision of the trial court nor (sic) of the promulgation of said decision.

Moreover, quoting Pimping v. COMELEC,[50] citing Macabingkil v. Yatco,[51] we further held in the same case that failure to receive advance notice of the promulgation of a decision is not sufficient to set aside the COMELEC’s judgment, as long as the parties have been afforded an opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered, viz:

The fact that petitioners were not served notice in advance of the promulgation of the decision in the election protest cases, in Our view, does not constitute reversible error or a reason sufficient enough to compel and warrant the setting aside of the judgment rendered by the Comelec. Petitioners anchor their argument on an alleged denial to them (sic) due process to the deviation by the Comelec from its own made rules. However, the essence of due process is that, the parties in the case were afforded an opportunity to be heard.

In the present case, we read from the COMELEC Order that the exigencies attendant to the holding of the country’s first automated national elections had necessitated that the COMELEC suspend the rule on notice prior to promulgation, and that it instead direct the delivery of all resolutions to the Clerk of the Commission for immediate promulgation. Notably, we see no prejudice to the parties caused thereby. The COMELEC’s Order did not affect the right of the parties to due process. They were still furnished a copy of the COMELEC Decision and were able to reckon the period for perfecting an appeal. In fact, petitioner was able to timely lodge a Petition with this Court.

Clearly, the COMELEC validly exercised its constitutionally granted power to make its own rules of procedure when it issued the 4 May 2010 Order suspending Section 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8696. Consequently, the second assailed Resolution of the COMELEC cannot be set aside on the ground of COMELEC’s failure to issue to petitioner a notice setting the date of the promulgation thereof.

2. On whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that Sabili failed to prove compliance with the one-year residency requirement for local elective officials

As a general rule, the Court does not ordinarily review the COMELEC’s appreciation and evaluation of evidence. However, exceptions thereto have been established, including when the COMELEC's appreciation and evaluation of evidence become so grossly unreasonable as to turn into an error of jurisdiction. In these instances, the Court is compelled by its bounden constitutional duty to intervene and correct the COMELEC's error.[52]

In Mitra v. Commission on Elections, (G.R. No. 191938, 2 July 2010), we explained that the COMELEC’s use of wrong or irrelevant considerations in deciding an issue is sufficient to taint its action with grave abuse of discretion -

As a concept, “grave abuse of discretion” defies exact definition; generally, it refers to “capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction;” the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough; it
must be grave. We have held, too, that the use of wrong or irrelevant considerations in deciding an issue is sufficient to taint a decision-maker's action with grave abuse of discretion.

Closely related with the limited focus of the present petition is the condition, under Section 5, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, that findings of fact of the COMELEC, supported by substantial evidence, shall be final and non-reviewable. Substantial evidence is that degree of evidence that a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion.

In light of our limited authority to review findings of fact, we do not ordinarily review in a certiorari case the COMELEC's appreciation and evaluation of evidence. Any misstep by the COMELEC in this regard generally involves an error of judgment, not of jurisdiction.

In exceptional cases, however, when the COMELEC's action on the appreciation and evaluation of evidence oversteps the limits of its discretion to the point of being grossly unreasonable, the Court is not only obliged, but has the constitutional duty to intervene. When grave abuse of discretion is present, resulting errors arising from the grave abuse mutate from error of judgment to one of jurisdiction.

Before us, petitioner has alleged and shown the COMELEC’s use of wrong or irrelevant considerations in deciding the issue of whether petitioner made a material misrepresentation of his residency qualification in his COC as to order its cancellation. Among others, petitioner pointed to the COMELEC’s inordinate emphasis on the issue of property ownership of petitioner’s declared residence in Lipa City, its inconsistent stance regarding Palomares’s relationship to the Pinagtong-ulan property, and its failure to consider in the first instance the certification of residence issued by the barangay captain of Pinagtong-ulan. Petitioner bewails that the COMELEC required “more” evidence to show the change in his residence, notwithstanding the various pieces of evidence he presented and the fact that under the law, the quantum of evidence required in these cases is merely substantial evidence and not clear and convincing evidence. Petitioner further ascribes grave abuse of discretion in the COMELEC’s brushing aside of the fact that he has been filing his ITR in Lipa City (where he indicates that he is a resident of Pinagtong-ulan) on the mere expedient that the law allows the filing of the ITR not only in the place of legal residence but, alternately, in his place of business. Petitioner notes that private respondent’s own evidence shows that petitioner has no business in Lipa City, leaving only his residence therein as basis for filing his ITR therein.

Hence, in resolving the issue of whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in ruling that petitioner had not sufficiently shown that he had resided in Lipa City for at least one year prior to the May 2010 elections, we examine the evidence adduced by the parties and the COMELEC’s appreciation thereof.

In the present case, the parties are in agreement that the domicile of origin of Sabili was Brgy. Sico, San Juan, Batangas. He claims that he abandoned his domicile of origin and established his domicile of choice in Brgy. Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City, thereby making him qualified to run for Lipa City mayor. On the other hand, respondent COMELEC held that no such change in domicile or residence took place and, hence, the entry in his Certificate of Candidacy showing that he was a resident of Brgy. Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City constituted a misrepresentation that disqualified him from running for Lipa City mayor.

To establish a new domicile of choice, personal presence in the place must be coupled with conduct indicative of the intention to make it one's fixed and permanent place of abode.[53] As in all administrative cases, the quantum of proof necessary in election cases is substantial evidence, or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind will accept as adequate to support a conclusion.[54]

The ruling on private respondent’s evidence

We begin with an evaluation of the COMELEC’s appreciation of private respondent’s evidence.

a) Petitioner’s Voter Certification, Registration and COCs in previous elections

Petitioner’s Voter Certification is a common exhibit of the parties. It states, among others, that petitioner is a resident of Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City, Batangas; that he had been a resident of Lipa City for two (2) years and three (3) months; and that he was so registered on 31 October 2009. The information therein was “certified correct” by COMELEC Election Officer Juan B. Aguila, Jr.

Private respondent presented this document as proof that petitioner misrepresented that he is a resident of Lipa City. On the other hand, the latter presented this document as proof of his residency.

The COMELEC correctly ruled that the Voter Certification issued by the COMELEC Election Officer, Atty. Juan B. Aguila, Jr., was not conclusive proof that petitioner had been a resident of Lipa City since April 2007. It noted that Aguila is not the competent public officer to certify the veracity of this claim, particularly because petitioner’s COMELEC registration was approved only in October 2009.

The Voter Registration Record of petitioner accomplished on 21 June 1997 showing that he was a resident of Sico, San Juan, Batangas, as well as his various COCs dated 21 June 1997 and March 2007 indicating the same thing, were no longer discussed by the COMELEC – and rightly so. These pieces of evidence showing that he was a resident of Sico, San Juan, Batangas on the said dates are irrelevant as, prior to April 2007, petitioner was admittedly a resident of Sico, San Juan Batangas. Rather, the relevant time period for consideration is that from April 2007 onwards, after petitioner’s alleged change of domicile.

b) Certificates regarding ownership of real property

The various certificates and tax declarations adduced by private respondent showed that the Lipa property was solely registered in the name of petitioner’s common-law wife, Bernadette Palomares. In discussing the import of this document, the COMELEC reasoned that, being a “seasoned politician,” he should have registered the Lipa property (which he claimed to have purchased with his personal funds) in his own name. Such action “would have offered positive proof of intent to change actual residence” from San Juan, Batangas to Lipa City, considering that he had previously declared his ancestral home in San Juan, Batangas as his domicile. Since Palomares and petitioner are common-law spouses not capacitated to marry each other, the property relation between them is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code,[55] where only the parties’ actual contributions are recognized. Hence, petitioner cannot prove ownership of a property and residence in Lipa City through the registered ownership of the common-law wife of the property in Lipa City.

On the other hand, petitioner bewails the inordinate emphasis that the COMELEC bestowed upon the question of whether the Lipa property could be considered as his residence, for the reason that it was not registered in his name. He stresses that the issue should be residence, not property ownership.

It is true that property ownership is not among the qualifications required of candidates for local election.[56] Rather, it is a candidate’s residence in a locality through actual residence in whatever capacity. Indeed, we sustained the COMELEC when it considered as evidence tending to establish a candidate’s domicile of choice the mere lease (rather than ownership) of an apartment by a candidate in the same province where he ran for the position of governor.[57] In the more recent case of Mitra v. Commission on Elections,[58] we reversed the COMELEC ruling that a candidate’s sparsely furnished, leased room on the mezzanine of a feedmill could not be considered as his residence for the purpose of complying with the residency requirement of Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.[59]

The Dissent claims that the registration of the property in Palomares’s name does not prove petitioner’s residence as it merely showed “donative intent” without the necessary formalities or payment of taxes.

However, whatever the nature of the transaction might be, this point is immaterial for the purpose of ascertaining petitioner’s residence. We have long held that it is not required that a candidate should have his own house in order to establish his residence or domicile in a place. It is enough that he should live in the locality, even in a rented house or that of a friend or relative.[60] What is of central concern then is that petitioner identified and established a place in Lipa City where he intended to live in and return to for an indefinite period of time.

Hence, while the COMELEC correctly ruled that, of itself, Palomares’ ownership of the Lipa property does not prove that she or – and in view of their common-law relations, petitioner – resides in Lipa City, nevertheless, the existence of a house and lot apparently owned by petitioner’s common-law wife, with whom he has been living for over two decades, makes plausible petitioner’s allegation of bodily presence and intent to reside in the area.

c) Certifications regarding the family members of petitioner

Private respondent presented a Certification from the DepEd, Lipa City Division, indicating that the names Bernadette Palomares, Mey Bernadette Sabili (petitioner’s daughter) and Francis Meynard Sabili (petitioner’s son) do not appear on the list of graduates of Lipa City. Private respondent also presented a Certification from the Office of the Election Officer of Lipa City that the names of these family members of petitioner do not appear in its list of voters.

As the issue at hand is petitioner’s residence, and not the educational or voting record of his family, the COMELEC properly did not consider these pieces of evidence in arriving at its Resolution.

The Dissent nevertheless asserts that because his children do not attend educational institutions in Lipa and are not registered voters therein, and because petitioner does not maintain a business therein nor has property

in his name, petitioner is unable to show the existence of real and substantial reason for his stay in Lipa City.

As to the Dissent’s first assertion, it must be stressed that the children, like the wife, do not dictate the family domicile. Even in the context of marriage, the family domicile is jointly decided by both husband and wife.[61] In addition, we note that the transfer to Lipa City occurred in 2007, when petitioner’s children were already well into college and could very well have chosen to study elsewhere than in Lipa City.

Also, it is petitioner’s domicile which is at issue, and not that of his children. But even assuming that it was petitioner himself (rather than his children) who attended educational institutions or who registered as a voter in a place other than Lipa City, we have held that “absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter other than in the place where one is elected, does not constitute loss of residence.”[62] In fact, Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that transfer of residence to any other place by reason of one's “occupation; profession; employment in private and public service; educational activities; work in military or naval reservations; service in the army, navy or air force, the constabulary or national police force; or confinement or detention in government institutions in accordance with law” is not deemed as loss of residence.

As to the Dissent’s second assertion, petitioner apparently does not maintain a business in Lipa City. However, apart from the Pinagtong-ulan property which both Suarez (the previous property owner) and Palomares swear was purchased with petitioner’s own funds, the records also indicate that there are two other lots in Lipa City, particularly in Barangay Lodlod, Lipa City[63] which are registered jointly in the name of petitioner and Palomares. In fact, it was private respondent who presented the Lipa City Assessor’s Certificate to this effect. Even assuming that this Court were to disregard the two Lodlod lots, it is well-established that property ownership (and similarly, business interest) in the locality where one intends to run for local elective post is not requirement of the Constitution.[64]

More importantly, we have gone so far as to rule that there is nothing “wrong in an individual changing residences so he could run for an elective post, for as long as he is able to prove with reasonable certainty that he has

effected a change of residence for election law purposes for the period required by law.”[65]

d) Affidavits of Lipa City residents

Private respondent also presented the affidavits of Violeta Fernandez[66] and Rodrigo Macasaet,[67] who were also residents of Pinagtong-ulan. Both stated that petitioner did not reside in Pinagtong-ulan, as they had “rarely seen” him in the area. Meanwhile, Pablo Lorzano,[68] in his Affidavit, attested that although the Lipa property was sometimes used for gatherings, he did “not recall having seen” petitioner in their barangay. On the other hand, private respondent[69] and Eladio de Torres,[70] both residents of Brgy. Calamias, reasoned that petitioner was not a resident of Lipa City because he has no work or family there.

The COMELEC did not discuss these Affidavits in its assailed Resolution. It was correct in doing so, particularly considering that these Affidavits were duly controverted by those presented by petitioner.

Moreover, even assuming the truth of the allegation in the Affidavits that petitioner was “rarely seen” in the area, this does not preclude the possibility of his residence therein. In Fernandez v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal,[71] we held that the averments of certain barangay health workers – that they failed to see a particular candidate whenever they made rounds of the locality of which he was supposed to be a resident – is of no moment. It is possible that the candidate was out of the house to attend to his own business at the time. The law does not require a person to be in his
home twenty-four (24) hours a day, seven (7) days a week, to fulfill the residency requirement.

The ruling on petitioner’s evidence

We now evaluate how the COMELEC appreciated petitioner’s evidence:

a) Petitioner’s Income Tax Returns for 2007 and 2008

The Income Tax Returns of petitioner presented below showed that petitioner had been paying his Income Tax (2007 and 2008) to the Revenue District Office of Lipa City. In waving aside his Income Tax Returns, the COMELEC held that these were not indications of residence since Section 51(B) of the National Internal Revenue Code does not only state that it shall be filed in a person’s legal residence, but that it may alternatively be filed in a person’s principal place of business.

In particular, Section 51(B) of the National Internal Revenue Code[72] provides that the Income Tax Return shall be filed either in the place where a person resides or where his principal place of business is located. However, private respondent’s own evidence – a Certification from the City Permits and Licensing Office of Lipa City– showed that there was no business registered in the City under petitioner’s name.

Thus, COMELEC failed to appreciate that precisely because an individual income tax return may only be filed either in the legal residence OR the principal place of business, as prescribed under the law, the fact that Sabili was filing his Income Tax Returns in Lipa City notwithstanding that he had no business therein showed thathe had actively elected to establish his residence in that city.

The Dissent claims that since the jurisdiction of RDO Lipa City includes both San Juan and Lipa City, petitioner’s filing of his ITR therein can also support an intent to remain in San Juan, Batangas - petitioner’s domicile of origin.

However, a simple perusal of the Income Tax Returns and Revenue Official Receipts for 2007 and 2008 shows that petitioner invariably declares his residence to be Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City, rather than San Juan, Batangas.[73] Hence, while petitioner may be submitting his income tax return in the same RDO, the declaration therein is unmistakable. Petitioner considers Lipa City to be his domicile.

b) Certification from the Barangay Captain of Pinagtong-ulan

The COMELEC did not consider in the first instance the Certification issued by Pinagtong-ulan Barangay Captain Dominador Honrade[74] (Honrade) that petitioner had been residing in Brgy Pinagtong-ulan since 2007. When this oversight was raised as an issue in petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration, the COMELEC brushed it aside on the ground that the said Certification was not sworn to before a notary public and, hence, “cannot be relied on.” Subsequently, petitioner presented another, substantially identical, Certification from the said Pinagtong-ulan Barangay Captain, save for the fact that it had now been sworn to before a notary public.

We disagree with the COMELEC’s treatment of the Barangay Captain’s Certification and find the same tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

Even without being sworn to before a notary public, Honrade’s Certification would not only be admissible in evidence, but would also be entitled to due consideration.

Rule 130, Section 44 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 44. Entries in official records.—Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.

In Country Bankers Insurance Corporation v. Lianga Bay and Community Multi-purpose Cooperative, Inc.,[75] we explained that the following three (3) requisites must concur for entries in official records to be admissible in evidence:

(a) The entry was made by a public officer, or by another person specially enjoined by law to do so;

(b) It was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and

(c) The public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts stated by him, which facts must have been acquired by him personally or through official information.

As to the first requisite, the Barangay Secretary is required by the Local Government Code to “keep an updated record of all inhabitants of the barangay.”[76]Regarding the second requisite, we have explicitly recognized in Mitra v. Commission on Elections,[77] that “it is the business of a punong barangay to know who the residents are in his own barangay.” Anent the third requisite, the Barangay Captain’s exercise of powers and duties[78] concomitant to his position requires him to be privy to these records kept by the Barangay Secretary.

Accordingly, there is basis in faulting the COMELEC for its failure to consider Honrade’s Certification on the sole ground that it was initially not notarized.

Meanwhile, the Dissent opines that the sworn affidavit of the barangay chair of Pinagtong-ulan that petitioner is a resident of Lipa City does not help petitioner’s case because it was not shown that the term “resident” as used therein carries the same meaning as domicile, that is, not merely bodily presence but also, animus manendi or intent to return. This Court has ruled otherwise.

In Mitra v. Commission on Elections,[79] the declaration of Aborlan’s punong barangay that petitioner resides in his barangay was taken to have the same meaning as domicile, inasmuch as the said declaration was made in the face of the Court’s recognition that Mitra “might not have stayed in Aborlan nor in Palawan for most of 2008 and 2009 because his office and activities as a Representative were in Manila.”

Assuming that the barangay captain’s certification only pertains to petitioner’s bodily presence in Pinagtong-ulan, still, the COMELEC cannot deny the strength of this evidence in establishing petitioner’s bodily presence in Pinagtong-ulan since 2007.

c) Affidavit of petitioner’s common law wife

To substantiate his claim of change of domicile, petitioner also presented the affidavit of Palomares, wherein the latter swore that she and petitioner beganresiding in Lipa City in 2007, and that the funds used to purchase the Lipa property were petitioner’s personal funds. The COMELEC ruled that the Affidavit was self-serving for having been executed by petitioner’s common-law wife. Also, despite the presentation by petitioner of other Affidavits stating that he and Palomares had lived in Brgy. Pinagtong-ulan since 2007, the latter’s Affidavit was rejected by the COMELEC for having no independent collaboration.

Petitioner faults the COMELEC’s stand, which it claims to be inconsistent. He argues that since the property regime between him and Palomares is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code (based on the parties’ actual contribution) as the COMELEC stressed, then Palomares’s Affidavit expressly stating that petitioner’s money alone had been used to purchase the Lipa property (notwithstanding that it was registered in her name) was not self-serving, but was in fact, a declaration against interest.

Petitioner’s argument that Palomares’s affidavit was a “declaration against interest” is, strictly speaking, inaccurate and irrelevant. A declaration against interest, under the Rules of Civil Procedure, refers to a “declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to testify against the interest of a declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to declarant’s own interest, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the declaration unless he believed it to be true.”[80] A declaration against interest is an exception to the hearsay rule.[81] As such, it pertains only to the admissibility of, not the weight accorded to, testimonial evidence.[82]

Nevertheless, we see the logic in petitioner’s claim that the COMELEC had committed grave abuse of discretion in being inconsistent in its stand regarding Palomares, particularly regarding her assertion that the Lipa property had been purchased solely with petitioner’s money. If the COMELEC accepts the registration of the Lipa property in her name to be accurate, her affidavit disavowing ownership thereof in favor of petitioner was far from self-serving as it ran counter to her (and her children’s) property interest.

The Dissent states that it was not unreasonable for the COMELEC to believe that Palomares may have committed misrepresentations in her affidavit considering that she had perjured herself as an informant on the birth certificates of her children with respect to the supposed date and place of her marriage to petitioner. However, this was not the reason propounded by the COMELEC when it rejected Palomares’ affidavit.

Moreover, it is notable that Palomares’ assertion in her affidavit that she and petitioner have been living in the Pinagtong-ulan property since April 2007 is corroborated by other evidence, including the affidavits of Pinagtong-ulan barangay officials and neighbors.

d) Affidavits from a previous property owner, neighbors, certificate from parish and designation from socio-civic organization

The Affidavit issued by Leonila Suarez[83] (erstwhile owner of the Lipa house and lot) states that in April 2007, after she received the down payment for the Lipa property and signed an agreement that petitioner would settle her bank obligations in connection with the said transaction, he and Palomares actually started residing at Pinagtong-ulan. The COMELEC brushed this Affidavit aside as one that “merely narrates the circumstances surrounding the sale of the property and mentions in passing that Sabili and Palomares lived in Pinagtong-ulan since April 2007 up to the present.”[84]

We disagree with the COMELEC’s appreciation of the Suarez Affidavit. Since she was its owner, transactions for the purchase of the Lipa property was within her personal knowledge. Ordinarily, this includes the arrangement regarding who shall pay for the property and when, if ever, it shall be occupied by the buyers. We thus consider that her statements impact positively on petitioner’s claim of residence.

The Dissent on the other hand argues that the claim that petitioner started living in the Lipa house and lot in April 2007 is made dubious by the fact that (1) there might not be enough time to effect an actual and physical change in residence a month before the May 2007 elections when petitioner ran for representative of the 4^thDistrict of Batangas; and (2) the Deed of Absolute Sale was notarized, and the subsequent transfer of ownership in the tax declaration was made, only in August 2008.

Before further discussing this, it is pertinent to point out that these were not the reasons adduced by the COMELEC in the assailed Resolutions. Assuming that the above reasons were the unuttered considerations of the COMELEC in coming up with its conclusions, such reasoning still exhibits grave abuse of discretion.

As to the Dissent’s first argument, it must be remembered that a transfer of domicile/residence need not be completed in one single instance. Thus, in Mitra v. Commission on Elections,[85] where the evidence showed that in 2008, petitioner Mitra had leased a small room at Maligaya Feedmills located in Aborlan and, in 2009 purchased in the same locality a lot where he began constructing his house, we recognized that petitioner “transferred by incremental process to Aborlan beginning 2008 and concluded his transfer in early 2009” and thus, he transferred his residence from Puerto Princesa City to Aborlan within the period required by law. We cannot treat the transfer to

the Pinagtong-ulan house any less than we did Mitra’s transfer to the Maligaya Feedmills room.

Moreover, the Joint Affidavit of twenty-one (21) Pinagtong-ulan residents, including former and incumbent barangay officials, attests that petitioner had begun living in the Pinagtong-ulan house and lot before the May 2007 elections such that it was where his coordinators for the May 2007 elections went to meet him.[86]Jacinto Cornejo Sr., the contractor who renovated the Pinagtong-ulan house when it was bought by petitioner, also swore that petitioner and his family began living therein even while it was being renovated.[87] Another Affidavit petitioner adduced was that of Rosalinda Macasaet, a resident of Brgy. Pinagtong-ulan,[88] who stated that she also sold a lot she owned in favor of petitioner and Palomares. The latter bought her lot since it was adjacent to the Lipa house and lot they had earlier acquired. Macasaet also swore that the couple had actually resided in the house located in Pinagtong-ulan since April 2007, and that she knew this because her own house was very near the couple’s own. Macasaet’s Affidavit is a positive assertion of petitioner’s actual physical presence in Brgy. Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City.

While private respondent had adduced affidavits of two Pinagtong-ulan residents (that of Violeta Fernandez[89] and Rodrigo Macasaet)[90] attesting that petitioner could not be a resident of Pinagtong-ulan as he was “rarely seen” in the area, these affidavits were controverted by the Joint affidavit of twenty-one (21) Pinagtong-ulan residents who plainly accused the two of lying. Meanwhile, the affidavits of private respondent[91] and Eladio de Torres[92] stating that petitioner is not a resident of Lipa City because he has no work or family there is hardly worthy of credence since both are residents of Barangay Calamias, which is, and private respondent does not contest this, about 15 kilometers from Pinagtong-ulan.

As to the Dissent’s second argument, the fact that the notarization of the deed of absolute sale of the property was made months after April 2007 does not negate petitioner’s claim that he started residing therein in April 2007. It is clear from the Affidavit of the property’s seller, Leonila Suarez, that it was not yet fully paid in April 2007, so it was understandable that a deed of absolute sale was not executed at the time. Thus:

That initially, the contract to sell was entered into by and between Mr. & Mrs. Meynardo Asa Sabili and Bernadette Palomares and myself, but eventually the spouses changed their mind, and after the couple settled all my loan obligations to the bank, they requested me to put the name of Ms. Bernadette P. Palomares instead of Mr. & Mrs. Meynardo Asa Sabili and Bernadette Palomares in the absolute deed of sale;

That it was Mr. Meynardo Asa Sabili who came to my former residence at Barangay Pinagtong-ulan sometime in the month of April 2007. At that time, Mr. Meynardo Asa Sabili was still running for Representative (Congressman) in the 4^th District of Batangas;

That after payment of the down payment and signing of an agreement that Mr. Meynardo Asa Sabili will be the one to settle my bank obligations, Mr. & Mrs. Meynardo A. Sabili and Bernadette Palomares had an actual transfer of their residence at Barangay Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City;

That they started living and residing in Pinagtong-ulan in the month of April, 2007 up to this point in time; xxx[93]

As to the rest of the documents presented by petitioner, the COMELEC held that the Memorandum issued by the Guardians Brotherhood Inc. San Jose/Lipa City Chapter merely declares the designation of petitioner in the organization, without any showing that residence in the locality was a requirement for that designation. Meanwhile, the Certificate of Appreciation was nothing more than an acknowledgment

of petitioner’s material and financial support, and not an indication of residence.

We agree that considered separately, the Guardians Brotherhood Memorandum and the Pinagtong-ulan Parish Certificate of Appreciation do not establish petitioner’s residence in Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City. Nevertheless, coupled with the fact that petitioner had twice been elected as Provincial Board Member representing the Fourth District of Batangas, which encompasses Lipa City, petitioner’s involvement in the religious life of the community, as attested to by the certificate of appreciation issued to him by the Pinagtong-ulan parish for his “material and financial support” as President of the Barangay Fiesta Committee in 2009, as well as his assumption of a leadership role in the socio-civic sphere of the locality as a member of the advisory body of the Pinagtong-ulan, San Jose/Lipa City Chapter of the Guardians Brotherhood Inc. , manifests a significant level of knowledge of and sensitivity to the needs of the said community. Such, after all, is the rationale for the residency requirement in our elections laws, to wit:

The Constitution and the law requires residence as a qualification for seeking and holding elective public office, in order to give candidates the opportunity to be familiar with the needs, difficulties, aspirations, potentials for growth and all matters vital to the welfare of their constituencies; likewise, it enables the electorate to evaluate the office seekers’ qualifications and fitness for the job they aspire for xxx. [94]

Considering all of the foregoing discussion, it is clear that while separately, each evidence presented by petitioner might fail to convincingly show the fact of his residence at Pinagtong-ulan since 2007, collectively, these pieces of evidence tend to sufficiently establish the said fact.

Petitioner’s actual physical presence in Lipa City is established not only by the presence of a place (Pinagtong-ulan house and lot) he can actually live in, but also the affidavits of various persons in Pinagtong-ulan, and the Certification of its barangay captain. Petitioner’s substantial and real interest in establishing his domicile of choice in Lipa City is also sufficiently shown not only by the acquisition of additional property in the area and the transfer of his voter registration, but also his participation in the community’s socio-civic and religious life, as well as his declaration in his ITR that he is a resident thereof.

We therefore rule that petitioner has been able to adduce substantial evidence to demonstrate compliance with the one-year residency requirement for local elective officials under the law.

In view of this Court’s finding that petitioner has not misrepresented his residence at Pinagtong-ulan and the duration thereof, there is no need to further discuss whether there was material and deliberate misrepresentation of the residency qualification in his COC.

As a final note, we do not lose sight of the fact that Lipa City voters manifested their own judgment regarding the qualifications of petitioner when they voted for him, notwithstanding that the issue of his residency qualification had been raised prior to the elections. Petitioner has garnered the highest number of votes (55,268 votes as opposed to the 48,825 votes in favor of his opponent, Oscar Gozos)[95] legally cast for the position of Mayor of Lipa City and has consequently been proclaimed duly elected municipal Mayor of Lipa City during the last May 2010 elections[96]

In this regard, we reiterate our ruling in Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections[97] that “(t)o successfully challenge a winning candidate's qualifications, the petitioner must clearly demonstrate that the ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to constitutional and legal principles that overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the people, would ultimately create greater prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our Constitution and laws so zealously protect and promote.”

Similarly, in Japzon v. Commission on Elections,[98] we concluded that “when the evidence of the alleged lack of residence qualification of a candidate for an elective position is weak or inconclusive and it clearly appears that the purpose of the law would not be thwarted by upholding the victor's right to the office, the will of the electorate should be respected. For the purpose of election laws is to give effect to, rather than frustrate, the will of the voters.”

In sum, we grant the Petition not only because petitioner sufficiently established his compliance with the one-year residency requirement for local elective officials under the law. We also recognize that “(a)bove and beyond all, the determination of the true will of the electorate should be paramount. It is their voice, not ours or of anyone else, that must prevail. This, in essence, is the democracy we continue to hold sacred.”[99]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed COMELEC Resolutions dated 26 January 2010 and 17 August 2010 in Florencio Librea v. Meynardo A. Sabili [SPA No. 09-047(DC)] are ANNULLED. Private respondent’s Petition to cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of Meynardo A. Sabili is DENIED. The Status Quo Ante Order issued by this Court on 7 September 2010 is MADE PERMANENT.

SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR: