Showing posts with label venue. Show all posts
Showing posts with label venue. Show all posts

Sunday, September 9, 2012

Paglaum Management & Development Corp. et al., v. Union Bank of the Philippines, et al.,


epublic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila

 

SECOND DIVISION



PAGLAUM MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP. and HEALTH MARKETING TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,                                         
Petitioners,


                       - versus -


UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, NOTARY PUBLIC JOHN DOE, and REGISTER OF DEEDS of Cebu City and Cebu Province
                    Respondents.


J. KING & SONS CO., INC.
Intervenor.

G.R. No.  179018

Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
BRION,
PEREZ,
SERENO, and
REYES, JJ.










Promulgated:        

June 18, 2012

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D E C I S I O N

SERENO, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision dated 31 May 2007[1] and Resolution dated 24 July 2007[2] issued by the Court of Appeals (CA).
Petitioner Paglaum Management and Development Corporation (PAGLAUM) is the registered owner of three parcels of land located in the Province of Cebu[3]and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 112488,[4] 112489,[5] and T-68516.[6] These lots are co-owned by Benjamin B. Dy, the president of petitioner Health Marketing Technologies, Inc. (HealthTech), and his mother and siblings.[7]
On 3 February 1994, respondent Union Bank of the Philippines (Union Bank) extended HealthTech a credit line in the amount of ₱10,000,000.[8] To secure this obligation, PAGLAUM executed three Real Estate Mortgages on behalf of HealthTech and in favor of Union Bank.[9] It must be noted that the Real Estate Mortgage, on the provision regarding the venue of all suits and actions arising out of or in connection therewith, originally stipulates:
Section 9. Venue. – The venue of all suits and actions arising out of or in connection with this Mortgage shall be in Makati, Metro Manila or in the place where any of the Mortgaged Properties is located, at the absolute option of the Mortgagee, the parties hereto waiving any other venue.[10] (Emphasis supplied.)
However, under the two Real Estate Mortgages dated 11 February 1994, the following version appears:
Section 9. Venue. – The venue of all suits and actions arising out of or in connection with this Mortgage shall be in Cebu City Metro Manila or in the place where any of the Mortgaged Properties is located, at the absolute option of the Mortgagee, the xxxxxxxxxxxxx any other venue.[11] (Emphasis supplied.)
Meanwhile, the same provision in the Real Estate Mortgage dated 22 April 1998 contains the following:
Section 9. Venue. – The venue of all suits and actions arising out of or in connection with this Mortgage shall be in _________ or in the place where any of the Mortgaged Properties is located, at the absolute option of the Mortgagee, the parties hereto waiving any other venue.[12]
HealthTech and Union Bank agreed to subsequent renewals and increases in the credit line,[13] with the total amount of debt reaching ₱36,500,000.[14]Unfortunately, according to HealthTech, the 1997 Asian financial crisis adversely affected its business and caused it difficulty in meeting its obligations with Union Bank.[15] Thus, on 11 December 1998, both parties entered into a Restructuring Agreement,[16] which states that any action or proceeding arising out of or in connection therewith shall be commenced in Makati City, with both parties waiving any other venue.[17]
Despite the Restructuring Agreement, HealthTech failed to pay its obligation, prompting Union Bank to send a demand letter dated 9 October 2000, stating that the latter would be constrained to institute foreclosure proceedings, unless HealthTech settled its account in full.[18]
Since HealthTech defaulted on its payment, Union Bank extra-judicially foreclosed the mortgaged properties.[19] The bank, as the sole bidder in the auction sale, was then issued a Certificate of Sale dated 24 May 2001.[20] Thereafter, it filed a Petition for Consolidation of Title.[21]
Consequently, HealthTech filed a Complaint for Annulment of Sale and Titles with Damages and Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Injunction dated 23 October 2001, praying for: (a) the issuance of a temporary restraining order, and later a writ of preliminary injunction, directing Union Bank to refrain from exercising acts of ownership over the foreclosed properties; (b) the annulment of the extra-judicial foreclosure of real properties; (c) the cancellation of the registration of the Certificates of Sale and the resulting titles issued; (d) the reinstatement of PAGLAUM’s ownership over the subject properties; and (e) the payment of damages.[22] The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 01-1567 and raffled to the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Makati City, Branch 134 (RTC Br. 134), which issued in favor of PAGLAUM and HealthTech a Writ of Preliminary Injunction restraining Union Bank from proceeding with the auction sale of the three mortgaged properties.[23]
On 23 November 2001, Union Bank filed a Motion to Dismiss on the following grounds: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the issuance of the injunctive relief; (b) improper venue; and (c) lack of authority of the person who signed the Complaint.[24] RTC Br. 134 granted this Motion in its Order dated 11 March 2003, resulting in the dismissal of the case, as well as the dissolution of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction.[25] It likewise denied the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration filed by PAGLAUM and HealthTech.[26]
PAGLAUM and HealthTech elevated the case to the CA, which affirmed the Order dated 11 March 2003[27] and denied the Motion for Reconsideration.[28]
In the instant Petition, PAGLAUM and HealthTech argue that: (a) the Restructuring Agreement governs the choice of venue between the parties, and (b) the agreement on the choice of venue must be interpreted with the convenience of the parties in mind and the view that any obscurity therein was caused by Union Bank.[29]
On the other hand, Union Bank contends that: (a) the Restructuring Agreement is applicable only to the contract of loan, and not to the Real Estate Mortgage, and (b) the mortgage contracts explicitly state that the choice of venue exclusively belongs to it.[30]
Meanwhile, intervenor J. King & Sons Company, Inc. adopts the position of Union Bank and reiterates the position that Cebu City is the proper venue.[31]
The sole issue to be resolved is whether Makati City is the proper venue to assail the foreclosure of the subject real estate mortgage. This Court rules in the affirmative.
Civil Case No. 01-1567, being an action for Annulment of Sale and Titles resulting from the extrajudicial foreclosure by Union Bank of the mortgaged real properties, is classified as a real action. In Fortune Motors v. Court of Appeals,[32] this Court held that a case seeking to annul a foreclosure of a real estate mortgage is a real action, viz:
An action to annul a real estate mortgage foreclosure sale is no different from an action to annul a private sale of real property. (Muñoz v. Llamas, 87 Phil. 737, 1950).
While it is true that petitioner does not directly seek the recovery of title or possession of the property in question, his action for annulment of sale and his claim for damages are closely intertwined with the issue of ownership of the building which, under the law, is considered immovable property, the recovery of which is petitioner’s primary objective. The prevalent doctrine is that an action for the annulment or rescission of a sale of real property does not operate to efface the fundamental and prime objective and nature of the case, which is to recover said real property. It is a real action.[33]
Being a real action, the filing and trial of the Civil Case No. 01-1567 should be governed by the following relevant provisions of the Rules of Court (the Rules):
Rule 4
VENUE OF ACTIONS
Section 1. Venue of real actions. – Actions affecting title to or possession of real property, or interest therein, shall be commenced and tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated.
Forcible entry and detainer actions shall be commenced and tried in the municipal trial court of the municipality or city wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated.
Sec. 3. When Rule not applicable. – This Rule shall not apply –
(a)                In those cases where a specific rule or law provides otherwise; or
(b)                Where the parties have validly agreed in writing before the filing of the action on the exclusive venue thereof. (Emphasis supplied.)
In Sps. Lantin v. Lantion,[34] this Court explained that a venue stipulation must contain words that show exclusivity or restrictiveness, as follows:
At the outset, we must make clear that under Section 4 (b) of Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the general rules on venue of actions shall not apply where the parties, before the filing of the action, have validly agreed in writing on an exclusive venue. The mere stipulation on the venue of an action, however, is not enough to preclude parties from bringing a case in other venues. The parties must be able to show that such stipulation is exclusive. In the absence of qualifying or restrictive words, the stipulation should be deemed as merely an agreement on an additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place.

x x x                            x x x                            x x x

Clearly, the words “exclusively” and “waiving for this purpose any other venue” are restrictive and used advisedly to meet the requirements.[35] (Emphasis supplied.)
According to the Rules, real actions shall be commenced and tried in the court that has jurisdiction over the area where the property is situated. In this case, all the mortgaged properties are located in the Province of Cebu. Thus, following the general rule, PAGLAUM and HealthTech should have filed their case in Cebu, and not in Makati.
However, the Rules provide an exception, in that real actions can be commenced and tried in a court other than where the property is situated in instances where the parties have previously and validly agreed in writing on the exclusive venue thereof. In the case at bar, the parties claim that such an agreement exists. The only dispute is whether the venue that should be followed is that contained in the Real Estate Mortgages, as contended by Union Bank, or that in the Restructuring Agreement, as posited by PAGLAUM and HealthTech. This Court rules that the venue stipulation in the Restructuring Agreement should be controlling.
The Real Estate Mortgages were executed by PAGLAUM in favor of Union Bank to secure the credit line extended by the latter to HealthTech. All three mortgage contracts contain a dragnet clause, which secures succeeding obligations, including renewals, extensions, amendments or novations thereof, incurred by HealthTech from Union Bank, to wit:
Section 1. Secured Obligations. – The obligations secured by this Mortgage (the “Secured Obligations”) are the following:

a)                  All the obligations of the Borrower and/or the Mortgagor under: (i) the Notes, the Agreement, and this Mortgage; (ii) any and all instruments or documents issued upon the renewal, extension, amendment or novation of the Notes, the Agreement and this Mortgage, irrespective of whether such obligations as renewed, extended, amended or novated are in the nature of new, separate or additional obligations; and (iii) any and all instruments or documents issued pursuant to the Notes, the Agreement and this Mortgage;

b)                  All other obligations of the Borrower and/or the Mortgagor in favor of the Mortgagee, whether presently owing or hereinafter incurred and whether or not arising from or connected with the Agreement, the Notes and/or this Mortgage; and

c)                  Any and all expenses which may be incurred in collecting any and all of the above and in enforcing any and all rights, powers and remedies of the Mortgagee under this Mortgage.[36]
On the other hand, the Restructuring Agreement was entered into by HealthTech and Union Bank to modify the entire loan obligation. Section 7 thereof provides:
Security. – The principal, interests, penalties and other charges for which the BORROWER may be bound to the BANK under the terms of this Restructuring Agreement, including the renewal, extension, amendment or novation of this Restructuring Agreement, irrespective of whether the obligations arising out of or in connection with this Restructuring Agreement, as renewed, extended, amended or novated, are in the nature of new, separate or additional obligations, and all other instruments or documents covering the Indebtedness or otherwise made pursuant to this Restructuring Agreement (the “Secured Obligations”), shall continue to be secured by the following security arrangements (the “Collaterals”):

a.                   Real Estate Mortgage dated February 11, 1994 executed by Paglaum Management and Development Corporation over a 474 square meter property covered by TCT No. 112489;

b.                  Real Estate Mortgage dated February 11, 1994 executed by Paglaum Management and Development Corporation over a 2,796 square meter property covered by TCT No. T-68516;

c.                   Real Estate Mortgage dated April 22, 1998 executed by Paglaum Management and Development Corporation over a 3,711 square meter property covered by TCT No. 112488;

d.                  Continuing Surety Agreement of Benjamin B. Dy;

Without need of any further act and deed, the existing Collaterals, shall remain in full force and effect and continue to secure the payment and performance of the obligations of the BORROWER arising from the Notes and this Restructuring Agreement.[37] (Emphasis supplied.)
Meanwhile, Section 20 of the Restructuring Agreement as regards the venue of actions state:
20. Venue – Venue of any action or proceeding arising out of or connected with this Restructuring Agreement, the Note, the Collateral and any and all related documents shall be in Makati City, [HealthTech] and [Union Bank] hereby waiving any other venue.[38] (Emphasis supplied.)
These quoted provisions of the Real Estate Mortgages and the later Restructuring Agreement clearly reveal the intention of the parties to implement a restrictive venue stipulation, which applies not only to the principal obligation, but also to the mortgages. The phrase “waiving any other venue” plainly shows that the choice of Makati City as the venue for actions arising out of or in connection with the Restructuring Agreement and the Collateral, with the Real Estate Mortgages being explicitly defined as such, is exclusive.
Even if this Court were to consider the venue stipulations under the Real Estate Mortgages, it must be underscored that those provisions did not contain words showing exclusivity or restrictiveness. In fact, in the Real Estate Mortgages dated 11 February 1994, the phrase “parties hereto waiving” – from the entire phrase “the parties hereto waiving any other venue” – was stricken from the final executed contract. Following the ruling in Sps. Lantin as earlier quoted, in the absence of qualifying or restrictive words, the venue stipulation should only be deemed as an agreement on an additional forum, and not as a restriction on a specified place.
Considering that Makati City was agreed upon by the parties to be the venue for all actions arising out of or in connection with the loan obligation incurred by HealthTech, as well as the Real Estate Mortgages executed by PAGLAUM, the CA committed reversible error in affirming the dismissal of Civil Case No. 01-1567 by RTC Br. 134 on the ground of improper venue.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is GRANTED. The Decision dated 31 May 2007 and Resolution dated 24 July 2007 in CA-G.R. CV No. 82053 of the Court of Appeals, as well as the Orders dated 11 March 2003 and 19 September 2003 issued by the Regional Trial Court, Makati City, Branch 134, are REVERSEDand SET ASIDE. The Complaint in Civil Case No. 01-1567 is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.





MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Associate Justice



WE CONCUR:




ANTONIO T. CARPIO                  
Senior Associate Justice
Chairperson





ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice






JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ  Associate Justice





BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice



C E R T I F I C A T I O N


          I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.




ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice
(Per Section 12, R.A. 296,
The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended)
 



[1] Rollo, pp. 45-53. Penned by CA Associate Justice Fernanda Lampas Peralta and concurred in by Associate Justices Edgardo P. Cruz and Normandie B. Pizarro.
[2] Rollo, p. 55.
[3] Petition, p. 5; rollo, p. 19.
[4] Rollo, pp. 75-76.
[5] Rollo, pp. 73-74.
[6] Rollo, pp. 77-78.
[7] Petition, p. 6; rollo, p. 20. See also Stockholders Resolution of PAGLAUM dated 11 December 1998, rollo, pp. 116-117.
[8] Credit Line Agreement dated 3 February 1994, rollo, pp. 80-81; CA Decision, p. 2, rollo, p. 46.
[9] Real Estate Mortgage dated 11 February 1994, rollo, pp. 173-176; Real Estate Mortgage dated 11 February 1994, rollo, pp. 177-180; Real Estate Mortgage dated 22 April 1998, rollo, pp. 181-184.
[10] Rollo, pp. 176, 180 and 184.
[11] Rollo, pp. 176 and 180.
[12] Rollo, p. 184.
[13] Letter dated 14 March 1995 of Union Bank to HealthTech, rollo, pp. 82-83; letter dated 11 February 1997 of Union Bank to HealthTech, rollo, pp. 84-85; Petition, p. 5, rollo, p. 19; CA Decision, p. 2, rollo, p. 46; Restructuring Agreement dated 11 December 1998, rollo, pp. 99-108.
[14] Restructuring Agreement dated 11 December 1998, rollo, pp. 99-108.
[15] Petition, p. 6; rollo, p. 20.
[16] Rollo, pp. 99-108.
[17] Id. at 106.
[18] Letter dated 9 October 2000, rollo, p. 122.
[19] Petition, p. 8; rollo, p. 22.
[20] Petition, p. 8; rollo, p. 22; CA Decision, p. 2, rollo, p. 46.
[21] Petition, p. 8; rollo, p. 22.
[22] Rollo, pp. 59-72.
[23] Resolution dated 13 December 2001, rollo, pp. 125-129.
[24] Rollo, pp. 130-135.
[25] Order dated 11 March 2003, rollo, pp. 166-170.
[26] Order dated 19 September 2003, rollo, p. 171-172.
[27] CA Decision, rollo, pp. 44-53.
[28] Resolution dated 24 July 2007, rollo, pp. 54-55.
[29] Petition, p. 12; rollo, p. 26.
[30] Comment [on] Petition for Review on Certiorari; rollo, pp. 260-268.
[31] Comment (On the Petition for Review on Certiorari) dated 26 December 2007; rollo, pp. 270-277.
[32] 258-A Phil. 336 (1989).
[33] Id. at 340-341.
[34] 531 Phil. 318 (2006).
[35] Id. at 322-323.
[36] Real Estate Mortgage dated 11 February 1994, rollo, p. 173; Real Estate Mortgage dated 11 February 1994, rollo, p. 177; Real Estate Mortgage dated 22 April 1998, rollo, p. 181.
[37] Restructuring Agreement, pp. 3-4; rollo, pp. 101-102.
[38] Restructuring Agreement, p. 8; rollo, p. 106.

Monday, January 30, 2012

People of the Philippines v. Hon. Jose Azarraga and John Prevendido

 Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
                               Petitioner,


       


                    - versus -





HON. JOSE D. AZARRAGA and
JOHN REY PREVENDIDO,                                         
                              Respondents.          
G. R. Nos. 187117 and 187127


Present:

CARPIO, J.,
       Chairperson,
BRION,
SERENO,  
REYES, and
PERLAS-BERNABE,* JJ.


Promulgated:

October 12, 2011

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D E C I S I O N

SERENO, J.:

In the present Petition for Prohibition with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order/Preliminary Mandatory Injunction under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, petitioner questions the legality of Chapter V, Section 9 of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC or the “Guidelines on the Selection and Appointment of Executive Judges and Defining Their Powers, Prerogatives and Duties” issued by this Court on 27 January 2004, in relation to Section 90 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On 7 February 2009, petitioner filed two (2) Informations[1] before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City against private respondent John Rey Prevendido for Violation of Article II, Sections 5 and 11 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. The cases were raffled to Branch 36, a designated special court pursuant to R.A. 9165, presided by Judge Victor E. Gelvezon. Soon after, however, Judge Gelvezon disclosed that Coreen Gemarino, the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) operative who conducted the entrapment operation against private respondent, had close family ties with him. Thus, in order to preserve the integrity of the court, Judge Gelvezon issued an Order[2] dated 17 February 2009 inhibiting himself from trying the case. The cases were then reassigned to the other special court, Branch 25, presided by Judge Evelyn E. Salao.
On 24 February 2009, Judge Salao also issued an Order[3] whereby she inhibited herself for the reason that Coreen Gemarino was a cousin; thus, the cases were endorsed to the Office of the Executive Judge for reassignment.
Citing Chap. V, Sec. 9 of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC, Executive Judge Antonio M. Natino ordered the Clerk of Court to forward the entire records of the cases to Branch 37 presided over by public respondent, the pairing judge of Branch 36, which was the special court that originally handled the cases.[4]
On 16 March 2009, however, as soon as public respondent proceeded with the cases, Prosecutor Kenneth John Amamanglon filed a Motion to Transfer Case to a Branch of Competent Jurisdiction.[5] He questioned the jurisdiction of public respondent to hear the cases, citing Sec. 90 of R.A. 9165. Prosecutor Amamanglon also claimed that, as the prosecutor assigned to Branch 37, he was not among the prosecutors who had been designated to handle cases exclusively involving violations of R.A. 9165.
On the same day, respondent judge denied the motion on three grounds, to wit:
1.      This motion ought not to have been filed in this court for lack of legal basis;
2.      This court is not without jurisdiction to hear the instant case;
3.      The matter about the appearance of Trial Prosecutor Kenneth John Amamanglon should have been addressed to the Department concerned.[6]

Respondent judge thus set the hearing on the Motion for Admission to Bail[7] filed on 10 February 2008. He directed the city prosecutor to assign an assistant city prosecutor to handle the case effective 20 March 2009.
          Prosecutor Amamanglon, however, moved for a reconsideration[8] of respondent judge’s Order, contending that the trial court needed a special designation from this Court in order to have jurisdiction over the cases. Thus, Prosecutor Amamanglon concluded, absent the special designation, respondent court should remand the cases to the Office of the Executive Judge for re-raffling to another court specially designated pursuant to R.A. 9165. To support its contention, petitioner further cited this Court’s 11 October 2005 Resolution in A.M. No. 05-9-03-SC, which clarified whether drug courts should be included in the regular raffle.
          Respondent judge denied the Motion for Reconsideration in its Order dated 20 March 2009.[9]  He held that A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC should be deemed to have modified the designation of special courts for drug cases. He declared that, under the circumstances enumerated in A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC, Branch 37 itself became a special court. He further ruled that A.M. No. 05-9-03-SC was inapplicable.
          On 23 March 2009, the city prosecutor endorsed the assailed Orders of respondent judge to the Office of the Solicitor General for the appropriate review and filing of the necessary action.[10] Thus, on 24 March 2009, petitioner filed the present petition before this Court.
On 27 March 2009, while the Petition for Prohibition was pending, respondent judge issued an Order[11] inhibiting himself from hearing the case after private respondent alleged that the former was biased for the prosecution. The cases were thereafter transferred to Branch 35, also a regular court, presided by Judge Fe Gallon-Gayanilo.
Absent a temporary restraining order from this Court, the trial court proceeded to hear the cases.
The present petition raises two (2) issues, to wit:
I.                   WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE DRUG CASES IN CRIMINAL CASE NOS. 09-68815/16 DESPITE HIS ASSIGNMENT TO A REGULAR COURT

II.                WHETHER OR NOT A.M. NO. 03-8-02-SC IS IN CONFORMITY WITH SECTION 90 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165, MANDATING THE DESIGNATION OF SPECIAL COURTS TO EXCLUSIVELY TRY AND HEAR DRUG CASES[12]

 At the outset, it is an established policy that parties must observe the hierarchy of courts before they can seek relief directly from this Court. The rationale for this rule is twofold: (a) it would be an imposition upon the limited time of this Court; and (b) it would inevitably result in a delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of cases, which in some instances, had to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues because this Court is not a trier of facts.[13] It is only for special and compelling reasons that this Court shall exercise its primary jurisdiction over the extraordinary remedy of writ of prohibition. However, in the case at bar, since it is only the Supreme Court itself that can clarify the assailed guidelines, petitioner is exempted from this rule.
The petition, however, must fail.
The crux of the matter in the present case is whether or not this Court violated Sec. 90 of R.A. 9165 when it issued A.M. 03-8-02-SC, particularly Chap. V, Sec. 9, which prescribes the manner in which the executive judge reassigns cases in instances of inhibition or disqualification of judges sitting in special courts. Petitioner insists that should respondent judge (now Judge Fe Gallon-Gayanilo of Branch 35) continue hearing and trying the case, it “would result in the circumvention of the legislative conferment of jurisdiction to a court to exclusively try and hear drug offenses only.”[14]
Contrary to the assertion of petitioner, this Court did not commit any violation of R.A. 9165 when it issued the assailed guidelines. Rather, it merely obeyed Article VIII, Sec. 5(5) of the 1987 Constitution, which mandates that the rules promulgated by this Court should provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, in conformity with the right of all persons to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.[15] As this Court stated in San Ildefonso Lines v. Court of Appeals,[16] there must be a renewed adherence to the time-honored dictum that procedural rules are designed not to defeat, but to safeguard, the ends of substantial justice.
Petitioner grounds its assertion on Sec. 90 of R.A. 9165, which states:
Jurisdiction. — The Supreme Court shall designate special courts from among the existing Regional Trial Courts in each judicial region to exclusively try and hear cases involving violations of this Act. The number of courts designated in each judicial region shall be based on the population and the number of cases pending in their respective jurisdiction.
...                                             ...                                             ...
Trial of the case under this Section shall be finished by the court not later than sixty (60) days from the date of the filing of the information. Decision on said cases shall be rendered within a period of fifteen (15) days from the date of submission of the case for resolution.

Petitioner interprets the above provision to mean that a court must be specifically designated by the Supreme Court as a special court. But what is Chap. V, Sec. 9 of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC if not an express designation of a special court?
Chap. V, Sec. 9 of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC provides:
Raffle and re-assignment of cases in special courts where judge is disqualified or voluntarily inhibits himself/herself from hearing case. — (a) Where a judge in a court designated to try and decide
...                                             ...                                             ...
(3)        cases involving violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act, or ...
is disqualified or voluntarily inhibits himself/herself from hearing a case, the following guidelines shall be observed:
                        ...                                             ...                                             ...
(ii)        Where there are more than two special courts of the same nature in the station, the Executive Judge shall immediately assign the case by raffle to the other or another special court of the same nature. In case the Presiding Judge of the other special court is also disqualified or inhibits himself/herself, the case shall be forwarded to the pairing judge of the special court which originally handled the said case. If the pairing judge is also disqualified or inhibits himself/herself, the case shall be raffled to the other regular courts. At the next raffle, an additional case shall be assigned to the disqualified or inhibiting judge/s to replace the case so removed from his/her/their court... (Emphasis supplied.)

Under R.A. 9165, Congress empowered this Court with the full discretion to designate special courts to hear, try and decide drug cases. It was precisely in the exercise of this discretionary power that the powers of the executive judge were included in Chap. V, Sec. 9 of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC vis-à-vis Sec. 5(5) of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. Thus, in cases of inhibition or disqualification, the executive judge is mandated to assign the drug case to a regular court in the following order: first, to the pairing judge of the special court where the case was originally assigned; and, second, if the pairing judge is likewise disqualified or has inhibited himself, then to another regular court through a raffle. Under these exceptional circumstances, this Court designated the regular court, ipso facto, as a special court – but only for that case.  Being a “designated special court,” it is likewise bound to follow the relevant rules in trying and deciding the drug case pursuant to R.A. 9165.
Petitioner also contends that the legislative intent of R.A. 9165 is “to make use of the expertise of trial judges in complicated and technical rules of the special drug law.” Thus, petitioner suggests that in instances in which all the judges of special courts have inhibited themselves or are otherwise disqualified, the venue for the affected drug cases should be transferred to the nearest station that has designated special courts.
Petitioner’s suggestion is ill-advised. To subscribe to this suggestion is to defeat the purpose of the law.  Undoubtedly, petitioner’s unwarranted suggestion would entail the use of precious resources, time and effort to transfer the cases to another station. On the other hand, the assailed guidelines provide for a much more practical and expedient manner of hearing and deciding the cases.  To reiterate, over and above utilizing the expertise of trial judges, the rationale behind Sec. 90 of R.A. 9165 and Chap. V, Sec. 9 of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC is to effect an efficient administration of justice and speedy disposition of cases, as well as to breathe life into the policy enunciated in Sec. 2 of R.A. 9165, to wit:
Declaration of policy. – It is the policy of the State to safeguard the integrity of its territory and the well-being of its citizenry particularly the youth, from the harmful effects of dangerous drugs on their physical and mental well-being, and to defend the same against acts or omissions detrimental to their development and preservation. In view of the foregoing, the State needs to enhance further the efficacy of the law against dangerous drugs, it being one of today's more serious social ills.
Toward this end, the government shall pursue an intensive and unrelenting campaign against the trafficking and use of dangerous drugs and other similar substances through an integrated system of planning, implementation and enforcement of anti-drug abuse policies, programs, and projects. The government shall however aim to achieve a balance in the national drug control program so that people with legitimate medical needs are not prevented from being treated with adequate amounts of appropriate medications, which include the use of dangerous drugs.
It is further declared the policy of the State to provide effective mechanisms or measures to re-integrate into society individuals who have fallen victims to drug abuse or dangerous drug dependence through sustainable programs of treatment and rehabilitation. (Emphasis supplied.)


As a matter of fact, this Court also issued similar guidelines with regard to environmental cases,[17] election cases involving elective municipal officials,[18] and cases that involve killings of political activists and members of media.[19] Foremost in its mind is the speedy and efficient administration of justice.
Petitioner further points out that this Court issued A.M. No. 05-9-03-SC to define the phrase “to exclusively try and hear cases involving violations of this Act” to mean “...[c]ourts designated as special courts for drug cases shall try and hear drug-related cases only, i.e., cases involving violations of RA 9165, to the exclusion of other courts.” Hence, petitioner submits, drug cases should not be assigned to regular courts according to the procedure provided in A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC; in other words, the two issuances contradict each other.
Again, this Court disagrees.
Petitioner underestimates the rule-making power of this Court. Nothing in A.M. No. 05-9-03-SC or in A.M. No. 03-8-03-SC suggests that they contradict each other. In fact, both were issued with a common rationale, that is, to “expeditiously resolve criminal cases involving violations of R.A. 9165,” especially in the light of the strict time frame provided in Sec. 90 of R.A. 9165. Both provide for the guidelines regarding the assignment of drug cases to special courts. Thus, A.M. No. 05-9-03-SC provides for the exemption of special courts from the regular raffle under normal circumstances, while A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC provide for the assignment of drug cases to special courts except under special circumstances that would warrant reassignment to a regular court.
Moreover, the exemption of special courts from the regular raffle was not established as an ironclad rule. A.M. No. 05-9-03-SC does in fact allow special courts to acquire jurisdiction over cases that are not drug cases. In the interest of justice, executive judges may recommend to the Supreme Court the inclusion of drug courts in the regular raffle, and this Court has the discretion to approve the recommendation, as the Resolution states:
WHEREFORE, Executive Judges and presiding judges of special courts for drug cases shall hereby observe the following guidelines:
...                                             ...                                             ...
4.      If, in the opinion of Executive Judges, the caseload of certain drug courts allows their inclusion in the regular raffle without adversely affecting their ability to expeditiously resolve the drug cases assigned to them and their inclusion in the regular raffle becomes necessary to decongest the caseload of other branches, the concerned Executive Judges shall recommend to this Court the inclusion of drug courts in their jurisdiction in the regular raffle. The concerned drug courts shall remain exempt from the regular raffle until the recommendation is approved. (Emphasis supplied.)

In conclusion, the two sets of guidelines are examples of this Court’s foresight and prudence in the exercise of its rule-making power. These guidelines were issued to prevent or address possible scenarios that might hinder the proper administration of justice.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for Prohibition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.


                            MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Associate Justice




WE CONCUR:

 


ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson




    ARTURO D. BRION                                       BIENVENIDO L. REYES         
         Associate Justice                                                  Associate Justice




ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

A T T E S T A T I O N

            I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

                                                            ANTONIO T. CARPIO
                                                                  Associate Justice
                                                                      Chairperson, Second Division

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

          Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
                                                                                          Chief Justice


* Designated as Acting Member of the Second Division vice Associate Justice Jose P. Perez per Special Order No. 1114 dated 3 October  2011.
[1] Rollo, pp.  27-28.
[2] Id. at 33-36.
[3] Id. at 37.
[4] Id. at 38-39.
[5] Id. at 42-43.
[6] Id. at 49-50.
[7] Id. at 30-31.
[8] Id. at 44-48.
[9] Id. at 25-26.
[10] Id. at 51.
[11] Id. at 58-60.
[12] Id at 10.
[13] Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Hon. Achilles Melicor, G.R. No. 140954, 12 April 2005, 455 SCRA 460; Liga ng Mga Barangay Motional v. Atienza, Jr., G.R. No. 154599, 21 January 2004, 420 SCRA 562.
[14] Rollo, p. 15.
[15] Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 16.
[16] G.R. No. 119771, 24 April 1998, 289 SCRA 568.
[17] Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 23-08, Designation of Special Courts to Hear, Try and Decide Environmental Cases, 28 January 2008.
[18] Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 54-07, Designation of Special Courts to Hear, Try and Decide Election Contests Involving Elective Municipal Officials, 11 May 2007.
[19] Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 25-07, Designation of Special Courts to Hear, Try and Decide Cases Involving Killings of Political Activists and Members of Media, 1 March 2007.

Source: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/october2011/187117.htm