Showing posts with label treachery. Show all posts
Showing posts with label treachery. Show all posts

Sunday, September 9, 2012

People of the Philippines v. Ruperto Dones a.k.a. Perto


Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
                          Plaintiff-Appellee,




               - versus -




RUPERTO DONES a.k.a. PERTO,
                          Accused-Appellant.           

G.R. No. 188329

Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
BRION,
PEREZ,
SERENO, and
REYES, JJ.

Promulgated:

June 20, 2012
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

DECISION
SERENO, J.:
Before this Court is an appeal from the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated 28 April 2009, which affirmed the judgment[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Gumaca, Quezon. The RTC found accused Ruperto Dones guilty of murder, for which sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay ₱50,000 as civil indemnity and ₱50,000 as moral damages.
For eight years, spouses Melanie and Tersiro de Gala worked as overseers of a fishpond owned by John Victoria and located in Sitio Bacolod.[3] On 15 January 2002, around 9:30 p.m., they were traversing the rice paddies of Sitio Bacolod, Barangay Manlampong in San Narciso, Quezon.[4] They were returning to the fishpond, where they also resided, after a day of selling shrimps. Melanie walked one meter ahead of her husband in the waist-high grass, holding a flashlight to light the way. She was waiting for Tersiro to cross the prinsa or gate bordering the fishpond, when he was shot by another man standing five meters in front of them. She was searching for the direction where the shots came from when she trained the flashlight directly at the face of a man she recognized to be Ruperto Dones. Even after Tersiro fell down, Dones allegedly kept shooting at him with a gun about eight inches long.[5] Frightened, Melanie moved backward, turned off the flashlight, and called for help. Dones finally stopped shooting and ran away. Rudy, a tuba gatherer, responded to her call and went to the Centro, where he enlisted the aid of the townsfolk. When he came back with several companions, Tersiro was already dead.[6]
The postmortem findings indicated multiple gunshot wounds as the cause of death. A total of eight wounds were found on the victim’s body.[7] On cross-examination, Melanie testified that she recognized the accused Dones, because he had been employed in the same fishpond for two years.[8] Before he worked there as a guard, he was also employed as a laborer constructing dikes under the supervision of Tersiro. A month before the incident, Melanie learned from their neighbors and from the accused himself that Dones harboured a grudge against her husband for allegedly discrediting him in front of their employer.[9]
For his part, Dones claims that he was at Sitio Bacolod at the time of the incident, pumping water into the fishpond owned by Felicito Dinglasan.  Dones was accompanied by Hagibis Agason, the latter’s wife and children, Boy Sevilla, Pito Sevilla, and Arnold Collato; none of them, however was able to testify at the trial. Dones denied assertion of Melanie that she saw him shoot her husband that night. He explained that her accusation was triggered by his failure to attend the funeral wake of her husband.[10]
The Ruling of the RTC
The trial court gave full credence to Melanie’s eyewitness account, describing it as “enlightening...frank, categorical and straightforward.”[11] It ruled that the intent to kill was manifest in the manner in which Dones shot Tersiro repeatedly, even when the latter had fallen to the ground, thus ensuring that the victim would not leave the place alive. The RTC also found that treachery was present based on the following: the suddenness of the attack, the remoteness of the place, and the fact that the shooting occurred at nighttime. These were factors that contributed to the helplessness of Melanie and Tersiro and ensured the execution of the crime.[12] The trial court found that the defense of alibi proffered by the accused was weak and unsubstantiated. Furthermore, the place where he claimed to be pumping water was a mere six meters away from the spot where the victim was shot.[13] Thus, the accused was not able to prove that it was physically impossible for him to be present at the scene of the crime. His blanket denials were also insufficient to create reasonable doubt or make a dent in the solid case forwarded by the prosecution.[14]

The ruling of the CA
On appeal, accused-appellant questioned the trial court’s reliance on the testimony given by Melanie, as well as its appreciation of the qualifying circumstance of treachery. He argued that her act of focusing her flashlight on the face of the assassin was inconsistent with her claim that she turned it off right away out of fear. Her claim of seeing the firearm held by the assailant was purportedly false, given that the incident transpired at night, and no illumination was available save for the beam from a single flashlight, which was quickly turned off. The trial court purportedly erred in appreciating alevosia and qualifying the crime as murder, because the prosecution failed to establish the particular mode of attack used by appellant or the fact that he deliberately adopted this mode to fend off any retaliation from the victim.[15]
The CA affirmed the findings of the RTC in all respects, ruling that Melanie consistently narrated what transpired that night: that she focused the flashlight’s beam on the face of the accused and turned it off only after he had repeatedly shot her husband.[16] The CA found that her testimony coincided with the postmortem examination of Dr. Reynaldo Florido. It also affirmed the RTC’s finding of treachery in the suddenness of the attack upon the couple, who were caught off-guard by the accused.
The accused has now elevated his case to this Court. In compliance with its Resolution dated 10 August 2009, he manifested[17] on 20 October 2009 that he was adopting, as supplemental brief,[18] the Appellant’s Brief that he had submitted to the CA. He assigns the following errors, which allegedly warrant a reversal of the RTC’s findings:
I.                   The trial court erred in finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged by relying on the inconsistent and unnatural testimony of the alleged eyewitness.

II.                The court a quo gravely erred in finding accused-appellant guilty of the crime charged despite the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

III.             The trial court gravely erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
The Court’s Ruling
After a careful scrutiny of the records and pleadings, we find no cogent reason to overturn the findings of the RTC or the CA. Anent the reliance of the RTC on the eyewitness testimony of Melanie, this particular finding is best left to its competence. The assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is best undertaken by the trial court due to its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling examination.[19] Unless trial courts are found to have plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value, their conclusions on the credibility of witnesses should be respected.[20]
In any case, the RTC correctly evaluated Melanie’s testimony to be candid and straightforward. Her account of the events on the night of           15 January 2002 was sufficiently detailed and unwavering, even under probing questions from the defense. In fact, the answers she provided on cross-examination only served to highlight the positive identification of the accused as the killer:
Q:        And you and your husband has a flashlight with you, is that correct?
A:        Yes, sir, I was the one carrying the flashlight.

Q:        How many batteries is that flashlight powered?
A:        Chargeable flashlight, sir, as long as this (Witness indicating a length of about one (1) foot).
Q:        It has two (2) bulbs?
A:        Only one (1), sir.
Q:        So the light of that flashlight was spread wide?
A:        The light of the flashlight is round (buo), sir.
Q:        When you focused your light, to what direction did you focus it in relation to where you were standing and your husband was shot?
A:        My husband was shot and then I focused my flashlight, I saw that he was there, sir.
Q:        Now, you said you focused your light when your husband was shot and you saw Ruperto Dones shot your husband. To the direction where you were going, where was Ruperto Dones shooting your husband?
A:         He was on my front, I was facing him and I was waiting for my husband to traverse the prinsa, sir.
Q:        You mentioned ‘prinsa.’ What is this ‘prinsa’?
A:         That is the place where we get the shrimps, sir, the water-gate.
Q:        It is now clear that your husband was at your back, Ruperto Dones in your front, you are at the middle, is that correct?
A:         No, sir, my husband was in front of me?
Q:        When you were walking, your husband was walking ahead of you, is that correct?
A:         He was at my back when we crossed the prinsa, I was the one who crossed the prinsa and then I was waiting for my husband, I was facing him and then he was shot, sir.
Q:        Mrs. Witness, what was your interval with your husband when you crossed the water-gate or prinsa?
A:        From here, sir, up to there, about half meter.
Q:        So where was now Dones who fired at your husband?
A:        He was near the grassy place, sir.
Q:        How far from the place where you were with your husband when he was shot?
A:        From here up to the second bench, sir.
INTERPRETER: Witness indicated a distance which, upon stipulation between counsels, is estimated to be five (5) meters.
ATTY. HASIM:
Q:        So in relation to the place where you were facing, in what direction was this Dones about five (5) meters?

A:        He was in front of my husband, in front of me, sir, I saw him.[21] (Emphasis supplied.)

 Thus, contrary to the contention of the accused, Melanie was able to categorically identify him as the assailant who shot and killed her husband. There was no inconsistency in her narration of the details, particularly of the fact that she first trained the flashlight to light the way for Tersiro as he crossed the prinsa, but turned it off after she had moved backwards:
ATTY. HASIM:
Q:        Now while your husband was being shot by Ruperto Dones, what were you doing?
A:         When I saw he was our companion in the fishpond, I asked for help and I moved backward and I put off my flashlight, sir.
Q:        When you said you moved backward, to what direction did you move?
A:         At my back, sir, I walked backward, there is a dike.
Q:        About how many meters did you move backward from your husband?
A:         From here up to there, sir.
INTERPRETER: Witness indicated a distance which, upon stipulation between counsels, is about four (4) meters.[22]
Accused appellant insists that the narration of Melanie and her conduct then were contrary to human experience and unbelievable. However, nothing in the records or even in the Appellant’s Brief would warrant that conclusion. What is unbelievable is the contention of the accused that Melanie fabricated her account only because he was not able to attend the funeral wake for Tersiro. The RTC rightly dismissed this allegation as a flimsy afterthought. Moreover, the argument that Melanie might have committed a mistake in identifying the perpetrator is bereft of support. We find that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that, on the evening of 15 January 2002, Ruperto Dones shot and killed Tersiro de Gala.
As to the contention that the qualifying circumstance of treachery was not proven in the present case, we concur with the CA and the Solicitor General that the prosecution sufficiently established the elements of the crime charged. In the Appellant’s Brief, the defense argued that treachery was not established, as there was no indication of the mode employed or that the accused consciously adopted such mode of attack.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof that tend directly and especially to ensure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from any defense that the offended party might make.[23] The elements of treachery are as follows: (1) the employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) the means of execution was deliberate or consciously adopted.[24] This is the essence of treachery -- a deliberate and sudden attack; affording the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or to escape. In treachery, what is decisive is that the attack was executed in such a manner as to make it impossible for the victim to retaliate.[25]
These elements were correctly found to be present in the intermediate appellate review. Although the accused was standing directly in front of the De Gala spouses, the victim Tersiro was preoccupied with crossing the prinsa when the accused started shootingThe CA found that the accused had waited for that exact moment before repeatedly pulling the trigger. The 
suddenness and unexpectedness of the attack, considering that it was nighttime and the place was deserted, rendered both Melanie and Tersiro defenseless. There was no means of escape, as they were trapped in waist-high grass between the prinsa and the accused.[26] It was apparent that accused-appellant sought cover in the darkness, waiting for the couple to return home. Even after Tersiro fell, the accused continued to pepper him with bullets, thus ensuring that the victim would not survive or retaliate.
In view of the foregoing, we deny the appeal and affirm accused- appellant’s conviction. We find it necessary to modify the civil liability of accused-appellant to include exemplary damages. Since the killing of the victim was attended by treachery his heirs are entitled to exemplary damages in the amount of ₱30,000, in accordance with jurisprudence.[27]
WHEREFORE, the 28 April 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02961 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.Appellant Ruperto “Perto” Dones is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, for which he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is further ordered to pay the heirs of the victim, Tersiro de Gala, ₱50,000 as civil indemnity ex delicto, ₱50,000 as moral damages, and ₱30,000 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.



MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Associate Justice




WE CONCUR:


ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice
Chairperson

    ARTURO D. BRION                                           JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ                      
         Associate Justice                                                         Associate Justice



BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice




C E R T I F I C A T I O N


          I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
                                                            Senior Associate Justice

(Per Section 12, R.A. 296,

 The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended)



[1] Penned by Associate Justice Jose Catral Mendoza, concurred in by Presiding Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and Associate Justice Ramon M. Bato, Jr., in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02961; SC rollo, pp. 2-18.
[2] Penned by Executive Judge/Presiding Judge Aurora V. Maqueda-Roman on 13 June 2007 in Criminal Case No. 7329-G; CA rollo, pp. 17-33.
[3] Id. at 2.
[4] Id.
[5] Id. at 25-26.
[6] SC rollo, p. 3.
[7] CA rollo, p. 20.
[8] Id. at 18.
[9] Id. at 19.
[10] Id. at 32, citing the TSN, 10 February 2005, p. 10.
[11] Id. at 22.
[12] Id. at 27.
[13] Id. at 32.
[14] Id. at 33.
[15] SC rollo, p. 8.
[16] Id. at 10.
[17] Manifestation In Lieu of Supplemental Brief, SC rollo, pp. 36-38.
[18] Brief for the Accused-Appellant, CA rollo, pp. 51-66.
[19] People v. Lopez, G.R. No. 172369, 7 March 2007, 517 SCRA 749, 760.
[20] People v. Padre-e, 319 Phil. 545, 554 (1995).
[21] TSN, 4 December 2002, pp. 13-17; as cited in SC rollo, p. 11-12.
[22] Id. at 13.
[23] Revised Penal Code, Art. 14, par. 16.
[24] People v. Lacaden, G.R. No. 187682, 25 November 2009, 605 SCRA 784, 801-802.
[25] People v. Tolentino, G.R. 176385, 26 February 2008, 546 SCRA 671, 697.
[26] CA Decision, SC rollo, p. 15.
[27] Supra note 24, at 805; People v. Gidoc, G.R. No. 185162, 24 April 2009, 586 SCRA 825, 837; People of the Philippines v. Arnold Pelis, 643 Phil. 598, 602 (2011).

Monday, January 30, 2012

People of the Philippines v. Arnold Agcanas


Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila

EN BANC


PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
                               Plaintiff-Appellee,
       








                 - versus -









ARNOLD T. AGCANAS,
                            Accused-Appellant.

G.R. No. 174476

Present:

CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,*
BERSAMIN,**
DEL CASTILLO,***
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,**
MENDOZA,
SERENO,
REYES, and
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.

Promulgated:        

    October 11, 2011
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

D E C I S I O N

SERENO, J.:






For the automatic review of this Court is the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00845 convicting the accused of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death and to pay damages.

The antecedent facts are as follows:
On 8 May 2000, the provincial prosecutor of Laoag City charged the accused with murder in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 16, Laoag City, under the following Information:[2]
That on or about 9:00 o’clock in the evening of May 4, 2000 at Brgy. Root, Dingras, Ilocos Norte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, with evident premeditation, with treachery and nightime (sic) having been purposely sought and inside a dwelling, did then and there willfully (sic), unlawfully and feloniously shoot WARLITO RAGUIRAG with an illegally possessed firearm of yet unknown calibre, inflicting upon the latter fatal gunshot wounds which caused the death of said WARLITO RAGUIRAG immediately thereafter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

NO BAIL RECOMMENDED.

Upon arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, trial ensued.
The trial court found that on 4 May 2000, at about nine o’clock in the evening while the victim Warlito Raguirag was having dinner at home, herein accused Arnold Agcanas entered the former's house through the kitchen door. The accused pointed a gun at the back of the left ear of the victim and shot him point-blank. Beatriz Raguirag, the victim’s wife, shouted, “We were invaded [sinerrek] by Arnold Agcanas.”[3] Under the 50-watt light bulb and with only a meter between them, the wife was able to identify the accused, who was the son of her cousin.
Around 9:15 in the evening, Senior Police Officer (SPO) 1 Jessie Malvar, SPO4 Bonifacio Valenciano, SPO1 Marlon Juni and Police Officer (PO) 2 Ramil P. Belong arrived at the scene of the crime and were informed by Beatriz Raguirag that Arnold Agcanas was the assailant. The police were also informed by several people that the accused had a relative in Barangay Naiporta, Sarrat, Ilocos Norte. Thereafter, around ten o’clock in the evening, the police found the accused in the house of his brother, Alejandro Agcanas, who was actually residing in Barangay San Miguel, Sarrat, Ilocos Norte. The accused then went willingly with the police officers to the police station.
The trial court further found that the crime was aggravated by the qualifying circumstance of dwelling, given that the crime was committed in the kitchen of the house of the victim. Finally, it held that the accused shot the victim with an illegally possessed firearm, although it was not presented as evidence. It did not, however, find the crime attended by the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and nighttime, there being no evidence presented to prove these two.
Thus, on 30 September 2004, the trial court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, qualified by treachery and attended by the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and the use of an illegally possessed firearm. The dispositive portion of the Decision states:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of the accused ARNOLD AGCANAS beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder qualified by treachery. With the same quantum of evidence, the aggravating circumstance (sic) of dwelling and the use of an illegally possessed firearm were duly established. No mitigating circumstance is accorded to the accused. Hence, the maximum penalty of DEATH is hereby imposed upon him with all its accessory penalties. Likewise, he is ordered to pay the widow of the victim WARLITO RAGUIRAG Seventy Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as civil indemnity; Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) as moral damages; Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as exemplary damages and the costs.
SO ORDERED.[4]


On intermediate appellate review by the Court of Appeals, the conviction was affirmed. However, the award of damages was modified based on prevailing jurisprudence. The dispositive portion states:




WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and sentencing him to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS as to damages.
The accused-appellant is ordered to pay the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity, Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), as moral damages, and Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00), as exemplary damages.
In accordance with A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC which took effect on October 15, 2004, amending Section 13, Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, let the entire records of this case be elevated to the Supreme Court for review.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

Accused-appellant assigns the following errors for this Court's automatic review:

I.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED.

II.

ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF THE VICTIM, THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING HIM GUILTY OF MURDER INSTEAD OF HOMICIDE ONLY.

III.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE CRIME WAS AGGRAVATED BY THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF DWELLING AND ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARM.


After a judicious review of the records, the Court finds no cogent reason to overturn the findings of the trial court.

This Court has held in a number of cases that denial and alibi are weak defenses, which cannot prevail against positive identification.[5] People v. Caisip[6] thus held:

Positive identification where categorical and consistent and without any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter prevails over a denial which, if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence is negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law. They cannot be given greater evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.


Beatriz Raguirag positively identified the accused as the one who had shot her husband. She was firm and consistent throughout her testimony. This Court does not see any ill motive on her part in testifying against her own relative regarding the death of her husband. Thus, there is no reason to question her credibility as a witness.

On the other hand, the accused miserably failed to satisfy the requirements for an alibi to be considered plausible.  For the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was at some other place at the time the crime was committed, but that it was likewise impossible for him to be at the locus criminis at the time of the alleged crime.[7]

The accused testified that he was attending the birthday celebration of his brother, Alejandro Agcanas, at the time of the incident. However, the trial court pointed out several inconsistencies in the testimony of the accused.

First, while he testified that the birthday celebration of Alejandro was on 4 May 2000, the latter was actually born on 22 July 1950. The accused also testified that the celebration ended around midnight, but Alejandro testified that the former left the house between 9:30 p.m. and 10:00 p.m. after the party. Meanwhile, the arresting officers said that upon reaching the house of Alejandro Agcanas, the lights were off and there was no celebration going on.  The trial court further reasoned that the house of Alejandro Agcanas was only 45 minutes away from the scene of the crime; therefore, it was not physically impossible for him to travel from the victim’s house to Alejandro Agcanas’ house where he was arrested by the police officers. Finally, another witness, Liwliwa Agcanas, a relative of the accused by affinity, likewise testified that her house was twenty (20) meters away from the victim’s house. On the night of the shooting incident, around nine o’clock, she saw the accused drinking with some others five meters from where she stood in front of her house.


Thus, the trial court correctly ruled that the alibi of the accused deserved scant consideration.

The accused additionally alleges that his right to counsel was violated when, on the morning of 5 May 2000, he made an admission without his lawyer that he had shot the victim. While it is true that an admission made by the accused without counsel is violative of due process and is therefore inadmissible, it must be noted that the findings of the trial court in this case were not based on the 5 May 2000 admission. The issue, therefore, is irrelevant to this case, since the trial court did not take the admission as evidence against the accused.

Anent the second assigned error, the Court likewise finds that there was treachery in the commission of the crime.

In People v. Dela Cruz,[8] this Court reiterated:
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make. The essence of treachery is that the attack comes without a warning and in a swift, deliberate, and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape. For treachery to be considered, two elements must concur: (1) the employment of means of execution that gives the persons attacked no opportunity to defend themselves or retaliate; and (2) the means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted.

The victim was then eating his dinner, seated with his back to the kitchen door.  Suddenly, without provocation or reason, the accused entered through that door and shot the victim in the head, causing the latter's instantaneous death. With the suddenness of the attack, the victim could not do anything, except turn his head towards the accused. The testimony of Beatriz Raguirag is revealing:

Fiscal Molina:
Q: You said Madam Witness in the last hearing that (that) was the time Arnold Agcanas entered(.) (W)hat portion of your house did Arnold Agcanas enter?
A: In (sic) the kitchen, sir.
Q: In what part (sic) of the kitchen did Arnold Agcanas enter?
A: At (sic) the door, sir.
Q: When you saw Arnold Agcanas enter, what happened next?
A: He immediately shoot (sic) Warlito Raguirag, sir.
Q: What was the place where Arnold Agcanas placed himself when he shoot (sic) your husband in relation to your husband?
A: At the back of my husband, sir.
...
Q: From the time you saw Arnold Agcanas enter the door of the kitchen up to the time he actually shoot (sic) your husband how long was it?
A: When he entered the kitchen he immediately shoot (sic) my husband and left hurriedly, sir.
Q: What part of your house did he exit?
A: (Through) [t]he door of the kitchen, where he entered, sir.[9]


Moreover, the accused was the nephew of the victim’s wife; thus, an attack from a relative right in their own home was unexpected. Since the accused was not a stranger to the spouses, the wife did not immediately demand that he leave as soon as she saw him enter the kitchen.

The trial court was also correct in ruling that dwelling was an aggravating circumstance. It has been held in a long line of cases that dwelling is aggravating because of the sanctity of privacy which the law accords to human abode. He who goes to another's house to hurt him or do him wrong is more guilty than he who offends him elsewhere.[10]


The aggravating circumstance of illegal possession of firearm was likewise properly appreciated, even though the firearm used was not recovered.  As this Court held in People v. Taguba,[11] the actual firearm itself need not be presented if its existence can be proved by the testimonies of witnesses or by other evidence presented. In the case at bar, Beatriz Raguirag testified that she saw the accused holding a gun and then heard a gunshot. The post-mortem examination also showed that the accused died of a gunshot wound. Thus, the presentation of the actual firearm was not indispensible to prove its existence and use.

Second, during pre-trial the accused admitted that he was not a licensed firearm holder.  As this Court stated in Del Rosario v. People of the Philippines:[12]

In crimes involving illegal possession of firearm, the prosecution has the burden of proving the elements thereof, viz.: (a) the existence of the subject firearm and (b) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed it does not have the license or permit to possess the same. The essence of the crime of illegal possession is the possession, whether actual or constructive, of the subject firearm, without which there can be



no conviction for illegal possession. After possession is established by the prosecution, it would only be a matter of course to determine whether the accused has a license to possess the firearm. Possession of any firearm becomes unlawful only if the necessary permit or license therefor is not first obtained. The absence of license and legal authority constitutes an essential ingredient of the offense of illegal possession of firearm and every ingredient or essential element of an offense must be shown by the prosecution by proof beyond reasonable doubt... (Emphasis supplied.)



          The judgment of the trial court must, however, be modified. On 24 June 2006, Republic Act No. 9346 (RA 9346) abolished the death penalty. Thus, pursuant to Section 2(a) of RA 9346, the accused shall instead suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
         
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00845 finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder is hereby AFFIRMED. By virtue of RA 9346, the penalty is MODIFIED, and the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole.  Based on prevailing jurisprudence, the award of damages is likewise MODIFIED.  The accused is ordered to pay P75,000 as civil indemnity,  P75,000 as moral damages, and P30,000 as exemplary damages to the heirs of Warlito Raguirag.

SO ORDERED.


MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
                             Associate Justice








WE CONCUR:






   RENATO C. CORONA
  Chief Justice





ANTONIO T. CARPIO



PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Associate Justice




TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO




ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
Associate Justice





DIOSDADO M. PERALTA




                  (On Official Leave)
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
Associate Justice




MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO




ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
Associate Justice


















MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

















(On Official Leave)
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
Associate Justice




JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA




BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
Associate Justice



 
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice






 

C E R T I F I C A T I O N


          Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.




RENATO C. CORONA
                                                                             Chief Justice



*    No part.
**  On official leave.
*** On sick leave.
 [1]  Rollo, pp. 3-16. Penned by Associate Justice Amelita G. Tolentino, with Associate Justices Fernanda  Lampas Peralta and Vicente S.E. Veloso, concurring and dated 26 May 2006.
[2]   CA rollo, pp. 9-10.
[3]   TSN, 29 June 2001, p. 3.
[4]  CA rollo, pp. 21-27.
[5]   People v. Mapalo, G.R. No. 172608, 6 February 2007, 514 SCRA 689; People v. Caraang, 463 Phil. 715; People v. Caisip,  352 Phil. 1058.
[6]   352 Phil. 1058, 1065.
[7]  People v. Malones, 469 Phil. 301; People v. Libo-on, 410 Phil. 378; People v. Marquez, 400 Phil. 1313.
[8]People v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 188353, 16 February 2010, 612 SCRA 738.
[9]   TSN, May 23, 2001, pp. 2-3.
[10] People v. Montesa, G.R. No. 181899, 27 November 2008, 572 SCRA 317; People v. Daniela, 449 Phil. 547; People v. Molina, 370 Phil. 546.
[11]  396 Phil. 366.
[12]  410 Phil. 642, 659.