October 19, 2010
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DISSENTING OPINION
SERENO, J.:
Ordering the 37 respondent members of the UP Law Faculty to “show cause” in this indirect contempt case is like ordering the little boy who exclaimed that “the emperor has no clothes” to explain why he should not be crucified for his public observation. It is true that the little boy in the present case may have aggravated the situation by adding that the unclothed emperor did not present a flattering figure in his natural state, but the analogy remains true – that the subject UP Law Faculty members have been prematurely adjudged guilty and asked to explain why such prejudgment should be reversed simply for expressing what they believed was the truth. There may have been exaggeration in the UP Law Faculty's process of expression, but this tempest is nothing that the Supreme Court has not similarly weathered in the past and faced with equanimity. What is so grievous about this whole contempt proceeding is that it comes in the wake of the gross injury that the Court has inflicted upon the virtue of honesty in learned discourses by labeling plagiarism as not plagiarism in the related case involving one of its members.[1]
With all due respect to my colleagues, it is not the place of the Court to seek revenge against those who, in their wish to see reform in the judiciary, have the courage to say what is wrong with it. The Court finds its legitimacy in demonstrating its moral vein case after case, not in flaunting its judicial brawn. There is nothing to be gained for the administration of justice in not letting this one instance pass just because feelings have been hurt and the urge to retaliate must be satisfied. If the 37 members of the UP Law Faculty are wrong, there will be recompense in their loss of esteem among the academic community and the legal profession. But if they are right, then the Court will have made martyrs out of those who – in their temporary passion – may have acted recklessly but truthfully and sincerely. Indeed, should they be proven right, they may even rise in esteem in the eyes of international academic and legal circles, for being the object of prosecution by one’s Supreme Court for bold but intelligent reformist language can be deemed a badge of honor similar to that bequeathed by history to the great thinkers who were persecuted by society’s reactionary forces.
Indirect contempt is committed in any of the acts enumerated in Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. The majority Resolution, which is the written charge required by said rule, fails to cite which particular mode of committing indirect contempt appears to have been violated. It is axiomatic to due process that the accused be informed specifically of the charge against them. A proceeding for indirect contempt is criminal in nature; thus, adherence to due process is more stringently required of this Court.
From a reading of the majority Resolution, it can be inferred that the following constitute the portions of the text of the UP Law Faculty Statement that draw the charge of indirect contempt: (a) the accusation that “an extraordinary act of injustice has been committed against the brave Filipinas who suffered abuse during a time of war”; (b) the casting of the decision as “a reprehensible act of dishonesty and misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the land”; (c) the further attempt to educate the Court on how to go about the review of the case; (d) imputations of deliberately delaying the resolution of the Vinuya case; (e) the dismissal of the petition on the basis of “polluted sources”; (f) alleged indifference to the cause of petitioners; (g) the supposed alarming lack of concern of the members of the Court for even the most basic values of decency and respect. The majority Resolution believes that the UP Law Faculty's comments have no purpose other than to “discredit the April 28, 2010 Decision in the Vinuya case and undermine the Court's honesty, integrity and competence in addressing the motion for its reconsideration.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Despite the description of what it considers the allegedly offending language of the Faculty Statement, the majority Resolution must still identify the specific paragraph of Section 3, Rule 71 of which the UP Law Faculty appears guilty and must not leave it to the reader to infer the basis of the complaint for indirect contempt.
Beyond the majority Resolution's failure to satisfy the technical requirements of Section 3, Rule 71 is the failure to see the purpose for vesting the Court with contempt powers. Contempt powers are given to and inhere in the judicial function because these are indispensable to the administration of justice. Thus, such powers must be exercised only when there is a causal relationship between the act sought to be reproved and the positive effect such reproof would have on the administration of justice. Sans this causal relationship, the exercise may be viewed as tinged with vindictiveness. It must be kept in mind that Rule 71 under Section 3 (c) and (d) is concerned with the “processes and proceedings of a court” and the “administration of justice,” not with the personal convenience of a judge.
This Court, as complaining party, must state plainly how its ability to view the motion for reconsideration of the Vinuya decision can be affected in any way by the UP Law Faculty's statement. It must also state plainly how its ability to enforce its future orders would be eroded by the release of the UP Law Faculty Statement. The milieu in which the Vinuya decision was received by the public is well-known. It is not as if any outrage at the Vinuya decision was caused by the UP Law Faculty Statement alone. It is also incredible how the Court can claim that its honesty, integrity and competence could be eroded by an extraneous act of any person other than itself. Either one is honest, has integrity, or is competent – or he is not. No one can undermine those qualities other than the one in whom they inhere.
Even more important to keep in mind is the apparently redemptive intent of the UP Law Faculty when it issued its statement. The statement is headlined by the phrase “Restoring Integrity.” In the second paragraph, the Faculty says: “Given the Court's recent history and the controversy that surrounded it, it cannot allow the charges of such clear and obvious plagiarism to pass without sanction, as this would only further erode faith and confidence in the judicial system.” In the next paragraph, it says: “The Court cannot regain its credibility and maintain its moral authority without ensuring that its own conduct, whether collectively or through its members, is beyond reproach.” In the same paragraph, it further says: “It is also a very crucial step in ensuring the position of the Supreme Court as the final arbiter of all controversies: a position that requires competence and integrity completely above any and all reproach, in accordance with the exacting demands of judicial and professional ethics.”
These statements indicate the Faculty’s passionate desire to see the torch of justice carried with honor and dignity by the highest court of the land, its steps unfaltering from moral or professional weakness. Instead of denigrating the Court, the Faculty wants the Court to remain the champion of justice, but the Court can only remain so if it demonstrates beyond question that it remains faithful to the ideals of truth and justice in every form, including in the honesty with which it makes use of its reference materials. The UP Law Faculty has in fact not only suggested ways by which the Court can uphold this role vis-à-vis the Vinuya decision, suggestions that this Court may ignore – it has fearlessly articulated a thought that is already so common in the minds of Philippine law practitioners: that sacrifice must accompany the act of atonement required of this Court for a breach of the standards of professional ethics.
Neither can I agree that Dean Marvic Leonen should be asked to show cause why he should not be punished for sending the Chief Justice mere dummies of the statement. In most cases, this Court merely gives the parties’ counsel the opportunity to satisfy the missing requirements. In any case, he has already submitted the signed original statement, so what is the Court fretting over? This use of a heavy hand on a small matter is profoundly disturbing.
The reason, I think, is that this Court has already prejudged the respondents. Reviewing the events, I realize that the language used in the majority Decision in the matter of the plagiarism charges[2], and the circumstances under which this “show cause” order is being issued, paint a chilling picture of the Court. When the UP Law Faculty statement was issued, the Court was taken aback, teetering a little from the blast of what they thought was the power of 81 signatures of the UP Law Faculty, including that of a retired justice. Then it found out that Dean Leonen, when ordered, was actually ready to transmit a statement with only 37 signatures. The Court recovered its composure and seethed that it could have been so destabilized. This turn of events may account for the victorious tone used by the plagiarism majority Decision when it referred to the UP Law Faculty Statement as a statement that had “appeared like solid teeth in the dummy [but] turned out to be broken teeth in the original . . . [a]nd retired Justice V.V. Mendoza did not sign the statement, contrary to what the dummy represented.” It seems to have gloated over the realization that now the antagonist is more manageable, consisting only of these 37 law professors, sans any retired Supreme Court justice. With more reason should the Court evaluate its mental and emotional frame before issuing the “show cause” order. Is it ready to squarely face the fact that the moral consequences of the plagiarism majority Decision are too horrible to imagine?
The timing of the “show cause” order; the implication in the related Decision[3] that the complainants in the plagiarism charge against Justice del Castillo are “hypocrites”; the needling over a small matter such as submission of a dummy vis-à-vis the original signed copies; and the apparent effect that the submission of the Statement had on the Court – all of these betray a Court that is bent on seeing itself redeemed not by hard and honest work, with the undertaking of proper remedial actions for when a member is in breach of ethics, but by showing who, in the land of lawyers, has power.
It is with sadness that I view the issuance of the “show cause” order embodied in the majority Resolution and dissent therefrom.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Associate Justice
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